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I. Introduction
One of the principal victims in the United States’ so-called
“war on terror” has been the independence of the U.S. Judiciary.
Time and again, challenges to assertedly illegal conduct on the
part of government officials have been turned aside, either
because of overt deference to the government or because of special
doctrines such as the state secrets privilege and standing
requirements. I have even described the behavior of the United
States since 9/11 as a “war on the rule of law.”1
This Article catalogs the principal cases first by the nature of
the government action challenged and then by the special
doctrines invoked. What I attempt to show is that the Judiciary
has virtually relinquished its valuable role in the U.S. system of
governance, which depends on judicial review. In the face of
governmental claims of crisis and national security needs, the
courts have refused to examine, or have examined with undue
deference, the actions of government officials. Oddly enough, the
mostly Republican Supreme Court has shown more stiff

1. Wayne McCormack, Responses to the Ten Questions, 36 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 5095, 5110 (2010).
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resistance than most of the lower courts,2 but still has ducked
some significant issues.3
In the cases considered here, the U.S. government has taken
the position that inquiry by the Judiciary into a variety of actions
against alleged malfeasors would threaten the safety of the
nation.4 This is pressure that amounts to intimidation. When this
level of pressure is mounted to create exceptions to established
rules of law, it undermines due process of law.
Perhaps one or two examples of government warnings about
the consequences of a judicial decision would be within the
domain of legal argument. But a long pattern of threats and
intimidation to depart from established law undermines judicial
independence. That has been the course of the U.S. “war on
terror” for over a decade now.
II. The Actions Challenged
What follows is simply a list of the governmental actions that
have been challenged and a brief statement of how the courts
responded to government demands for deference.

2. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 514, 529 (2004), rev’g 316 F.3d
450 (4th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the Fourth Circuit’s unfettered deference to the
Executive in determining a detainee’s “enemy combatant” status, yet accepting
the Government’s contention that full criminal procedures would unduly burden
military officials).
3. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 446–47 (2004) (dismissing a U.S.
citizen’s habeas petition challenging his “enemy combatant” status because he
had filed his petition outside the district of confinement); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 666–67 (2009) (describing Iqbal as a Muslim Pakistani who was
labeled by the FBI as an individual “of high interest” in the 9/11 investigations).
4. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 622 (2006) (rejecting the
Government’s contention that the danger posed by international terrorism
serves as a sufficient reason to deny traditional criminal procedures in military
commission proceedings); Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 51 (D.D.C.
2010) (agreeing with the Government that the Executive’s decision to kill a U.S.
citizen deemed a terrorist threat remains judicially unreviewable).

308

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 305 (2014)
A. Guantanamo

In Boumediene v. Bush,5 the Supreme Court allowed the
United States to detain alleged “terrorists” under unstated
standards to be developed by the lower courts with “deference” to
Executive determinations.6 The intimidation exerted on the Court
was reflected in Justice Scalia’s injudicious comment that the
Court’s decision would “certainly cause more Americans to be
killed.”7
B. Detention and Torture
Khalid El-Masri8 claimed that he was detained in Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) “black sites” and tortured.9 His case
was dismissed under the doctrine of “state secrets privilege”
(SSP).10
Maher Arar11 is a Canadian citizen who was detained at
John F. Kennedy (JFK) Airport by U.S. authorities, shipped off to
Syria for imprisonment and mistreatment, and finally released to
Canadian authorities.12 His case was dismissed under the
“special factors” exception to tort actions for violations of law by

5. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
6. Id. at 796.
7. Id. at 828 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
8. See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2007)
(describing El-Masri as a German citizen of Lebanese descent, who was
detained by Macedonian officials before being transferred to CIA custody).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 300, 312 (agreeing with the Executive that classified information
was “so central to the action that it cannot be fairly litigated without
threatening . . . disclosure”).
11. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 252–53 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(explaining that Arar, a Syrian native domiciled in Ottawa, Canada, was
detained by immigration officials while returning to Montreal from a family trip
to Tunisia), aff’d, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009).
12. Id. at 252–55.
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federal officials.13 Arar was awarded $10.5 million by Canadian
authorities.14
Jose Padilla15 was arrested deplaning at O’Hare Airport,
imprisoned in the United States for three and a half years
without a hearing and allegedly mistreated in prison.16 His case
was dismissed on grounds of “good faith” immunity.17
Binyam Mohamed18 was subjected to so-called enhanced
interrogation techniques at several CIA “black site[s]” before
being repatriated to England,19 which awarded him £ 1 million in
damages.20 The U.S. suit was dismissed under SSP.21

13. Id. at 279, 287 (precluding a substantive due process claim arising from
“torture, coercive interrogation, and detention in Syria” that implicates national
security and foreign policy decisions that should remain with the political
branches).
14. See Randall Palmer, Canada to Pay Arar $10.5 Million for Syria
Ordeal, WASH. POST (Jan. 26, 2007, 3:45 PM), http://www.washington
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/26/AR2007012600402.html (last visited
Feb. 3, 2014) (“Canada apologized on Friday to software engineer Maher Arar
who was deported to Syria by U.S. agents after Canadian police labeled him an
Islamic extremist, and paid him $10.5 million in compensation.”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
15. See Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 750–51 (9th Cir. 2012) (identifying
Padilla as an American citizen who was declared an enemy combatant due to
alleged associations with al Qaeda).
16. Id. at 751–52.
17. See id. at 762 (concluding that, due to Padilla’s “enemy combatant”
status, the Justice Department official allegedly responsible for his
mistreatment had no reason to know that Padilla enjoyed constitutional
protections).
18. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir.
2010) (en banc) (describing Mohamed as an Ethiopian citizen residing in the
United Kingdom who was apprehended on immigration charges in Pakistan).
19. Id. at 1075.
20. See Patrick Wintour, Guantanamo Bay Detainees to Be Paid
Compensation by UK Government, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 15, 2010),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/16/guantanamo-bay-compensationclaim (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (reporting that the Government had reached a
settlement with Mohamed and other Guantanamo detainees to compensate
them for British involvement in their detention and treatment at Guantanamo)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
21. See Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1086 (finding the Government’s claim of
privilege proper due to the threat that compelled or inadvertent disclosures of
classified information in the course of litigation may “seriously harm legitimate
national security interests”).

310

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 305 (2014)
C. Unlawful Detentions

Abdullah al-Kidd22 was arrested as a material witness, held
in various jails for two weeks, and then confined to house arrest
for fifteen months. His suit was dismissed on grounds of
“qualified immunity” and apparent validity of material witness
warrant.23
Ali al-Marri was originally charged with perjury, then
detained as an enemy combatant, for a total detention of four
years before the Fourth Circuit finally held that he must be
released or tried.24
Javad Iqbal25 was detained on visa violations in New York
following 9/11 and claimed he was subjected to mistreatment on
the basis of ethnic profiling.26 His suit was dismissed on grounds
that he could not prove Attorney General authorization of illegal
practices and because the Court was unwilling to divert the
attention of officials away from national security.27
Osama Awadallah28 was taken into custody in Los Angeles
after his name and phone number were found on a gum wrapper
in the car of one of the 9/11 hijackers.29 He was charged with

22. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2079 (2011) (explaining that alKidd, a U.S. citizen, was arrested and detained when checking in for his flight to
Saudi Arabia).
23. See id. at 2085 (finding that the Attorney General did not violate a
clearly established Fourth Amendment right when he pursued the “objectively
reasonable arrest and detention of a material witness pursuant to a validly
obtained warrant”).
24. See Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 195 (4th Cir. 2007) (“To sanction
such presidential authority to order the military to seize and indefinitely detain
civilians, even if the President calls them ‘enemy combatants,’ would have
disastrous consequences for the Constitution—and the country.”).
25. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 666–67 (2009).
26. Id. at 668–69.
27. See id. at 683 (finding that Iqbal’s complaint fails to demonstrate any
discrimination on the basis of religion or national origin and only shows that “in
the aftermath of a devastating terrorist attack,” law enforcement aimed to
detain “suspected terrorists in the most secure conditions available”).
28. See United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 2003)
(rejecting the district court’s conclusions that the material witness statute did
not apply to grand jury witnesses and that Awadallah’s detention violated the
requirements of the statute).
29. Id. at 45.
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perjury before a grand jury and held as a material witness.30 The
Second Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling that the
government had abused the material witness statute.31
D. Unlawful Surveillance
Amnesty International32 is one of numerous organizations
that brought suit believing that its communications, especially
with foreign clients or correspondents, had been monitored by the
National Security Agency (NSA).33 Its suit was dismissed because
the secrecy of the NSA spying program made it impossible to
prove that any particular person or group had been monitored.34
The validity of the entire Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA)35 rests on the “special needs” exception to the Fourth
Amendment,36 a conclusion that was rejected by one district
court37 although accepted by others.38
30. Id. at 48.
31. Id. at 49, 64; see also In re Grand Jury Material Witness Detention, 271
F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1269 (D. Or. 2003) (“I conclude that a grand jury proceeding
constitutes a ‘criminal proceeding,’ as the term is used in § 3144.”); In re United
States for a Material Witness Warrant, 213 F. Supp. 2d 287, 300 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (declining to follow the district court’s holding in Awadallah by
determining that the material witness statute should apply to grand jury
witnesses).
32. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 (2013) (finding
that the plaintiffs lacked standing due to the “speculative chain of possibilities”
offered in support of their allegations against the government).
33. Id. at 1145–46.
34. Supra note 32.
35. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92
Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C §§ 1801–1812 (2012)).
36. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 745 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (stating
that the Supreme Court has recognized an exception for “warrantless” and
“suspicionless searches” under the Fourth Amendment, when such searches
serve the government’s “special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement”).
37. See Mayfield v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1041 (D. Or. 2007)
(finding that the special needs exception does not apply to FISA when law
enforcement officers seek to conduct searches for ordinary criminal
investigations).
38. See United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102, 120 (2d Cir. 2010)
(“[A]ll other courts that have considered the issue . . . have rejected
constitutional challenges to FISA.”); United States v. Kashmiri, No. 09 CR 830-
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E. Targeted Killing

Anwar Al-Aulaqi (or Al-Aulaqi)39 was reported by press
accounts as having been placed on a “kill list” by President
Obama.40 A suit by his father was dismissed on grounds that
Anwar himself could come forward and seek access to U.S.
courts.41 Not only Anwar but also his son was then killed in
separate drone strikes.42
F. Asset Forfeiture
The Justice Department has found both Al Haramain Islamic
Foundation and KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian
Development to be fronts for raising money for Hamas, and their
assets have been blocked.43 Despite findings of due process
violations by the lower courts, the blocking of assets has been
upheld on the basis that their support for terrorist activities is
public knowledge.44
4, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119470, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2010) (declining to
follow the district court’s decision in Mayfield that FISA violates the Fourth
Amendment).
39. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2010) (describing
Al-Aulaqi as a U.S.–Yemeni citizen and Muslim cleric who was born and
educated in the United States before moving to Yemen in 2004).
40. Id. at 11.
41. See id. at 17 (rejecting the father’s argument that Al-Aulaqi must
remain in hiding due to the “threat of death” that has rendered him unable to
appear before the court).
42. See Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta: Lawsuit Challenging Targeted Killings, AM.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/national-security/al-aulaqi-vpanetta (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (describing the killings as a part of a larger
U.S. government program to target suspected terrorists outside of armed
conflict) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
43. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 686 F.3d
965, 970 (9th Cir. 2011); Kindhearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v.
Geithner, 710 F. Supp. 2d 637, 642–43 (N.D. Ohio 2010).
44. See Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc., 686 F.3d at 989 (finding that,
although the government violated the foundation’s due process rights by
refusing to provide notice before freezing its assets, such error did not prejudice
the government’s determination); Kindhearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev.,
Inc., 710 F. Supp. 2d at 660 (determining that the government could remedy its
due process violations by disclosing judicially approved classified evidence and
providing Kindhearts an opportunity to respond).
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G. Summary of Actions Challenged
The Guantanamo cases are a good starting point because
they show the Supreme Court answering government demands
for extreme deference with a modicum of deference but also a
claim of judicial review authority.45 The version of judicial review
adopted by the Court for the Guantanamo detentions ultimately
resulted in a watered-down form of review that does not
eliminate judicial independence entirely, but does allow a high
degree of deference to Executive determinations.
After looking at the Guantanamo decisions, I want to
illustrate the more extreme versions of deference for domestic
detentions by reference to several cases in which individuals have
been detained for years without any degree of judicial oversight.46
And then there are the basic underpinnings of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, which depends first on the “special
needs” exception to the Fourth Amendment,47 but then in
individual cases relies on virtually unreviewable statements by
government agents.48
III. The Lore of Judicial Independence
Much of this Article will deal with the ways in which
American courts have ducked (avoided, if that is a more neutral
term) claims challenging the legality of official action in the wake
of terrorism. Before turning to that discussion, it is worth taking
a brief look at what commentators and courts have said about the
issue of judicial independence, both domestically and
45. See infra Part IV.B (demonstrating that in the Guantanamo cases the
courts have spoken in deferential terms and sanctioned unusual procedures,
while retaining a degree of judicial independence).
46. See infra Part IV.C (discussing two cases in which detainees labeled as
“enemy combatants” remained in confinement for several years before obtaining
judicial review).
47. See infra Part IV.E (analyzing how a majority of courts have excused
warrantless government surveillance under FISA, by reasoning that threats of
violence give rise to special needs in law enforcement).
48. See ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F. Supp. 2d 20, 32 (D.D.C. 2003)
(finding that surveillance information gathered under FISA qualified for the
national security exemption to the Freedom of Information Act, precluding
public access to such documents).
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internationally. The latter point is part of how the U.S. courts’
avoidance has damaged the American global presence both
legally and politically. I hasten to add at the outset this caveat:
the discussion of the Justice Case from Nuremberg49 will show
emphatically that the American judges have not been complicit in
criminal activity but simply have shied away from their
traditional judicial review function over Executive action. What
remains is for the future to determine how and when that role
might be resumed.
I have no doubt that no Justice or judge has received ex parte
pressure or instruction from a member of the U.S. government. I
firmly believe that an Article III judge would cry “foul” at the
slightest hint of interference from the Executive. On the other
hand, judges are people and they do like friendship. Some of the
holdings described here have taken a very pro-government stance
in situations when the judge could have been more vigorous in
asserting the rights of the individual. The failure to stand up for
the little guy is what concerns me about the role of the courts and
their loss of judicial independence.
A. Righting the Ship of State
Numerous American commentators have pointed out that
courts tend to defer to the Executive during times of perceived
emergencies, and most of the commentators carry at least the
hope, if not the promise, that civil liberties will be restored when
the crisis has passed.50 Specifically, long before 9/11, Justice
49. See United States v. Alstötter, 3 T.W.C. 1 (1948), 6 L.R.T.W.C. 1 (1948),
14 Ann. Dig. 278 (1948), available at http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:
icl/485us47.case.1/law-icl-485us47?rskey=d0BpL5&result=2&prd=OPIL
(finding that a judge’s active participation in the program of racial
extermination developed by the Nazi Party constituted criminal activity).
50. See Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029,
1042 (2004) (describing a common law cycle in which judges demonstrate
flexibility in interpreting emergency powers during crises, but after the crisis
abates, initiate an “agonizing reappraisal, casting doubt upon . . . their
momentary permissiveness”); David Cole, The Priority of Morality: The
Emergency Constitution’s Blind Spot, 113 YALE L.J. 1753, 1785 (2004) (rejecting
the use of “suspicionless preventative detentions” during emergencies as a way
to reassure the public due to the underlying premise that people are “objects
whose liberty can be taken without regard to any threat they pose”); Oren
Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be
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William Brennan had acknowledged that the “Ship of State” may
right itself as the crisis eases, but asserted that the ship would
tend to founder again in the next crisis.51
Looking at the picture from the perspective of courts other
than the United States, Professor Shimon Shetreet subscribes
explicitly to the “ship of state righting itself” view:
International Jurisprudence has shown in the beginning of this
century, after the 9/11 attacks, complete acceptance of executive
and legislative emergency measures against terror. However, in
later years courts showed a very strict approach toward
executive and legislative counterterrorism measures. The
general pattern in most jurisdictions has been to broaden the
scope of judicial review of executive decisions in matters of
national security.52

Professor Shetreet rightly points to Canadian and U.K. court
decisions striking down extrajudicial detention measures.53 Chief
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1034 (2003) (“[I]n states of emergency,
national courts assume a highly deferential attitude when called upon to review
governmental actions and decisions.”); Laurence H. Tribe & Patrick O.
Gudridge, The Anti-Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1801, 1867 (2004)
(asserting that when courts make constitutional compromises in times of
emergency, such precedents will eventually “come back to haunt us”); Mark
Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003
WIS. L. REV. 273, 287 (recognizing a common understanding of how government
wartime policies affect civil liberties: “The government acts, the courts endorse
or acquiesce, and . . . society reaches a judgment that the actions were
unjustified and the courts were mistaken”). Perhaps the most direct apologia for
full deference is offered by George Alexander in The Illusory Protection of
Human Rights by National Courts During Periods of Emergency, 5 HUM. RTS.
L.J. 1, 25 (1984), which explains that the judiciary’s deference to the Executive
and military in times of national emergency recognizes that “they must deal
with extremely complex issues without the luxury of fact-finding.”
51. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Quest to Develop a Jurisprudence of
Civil Liberties in Times of Security Crises, 18 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 1, 6 (1988),
http://www.hofstra.edu/PDF/law_civil_hafetz_article1.pdf (“So far the United
States has fortunately been able to restore a democratic and constitutional
regime after each crisis . . . . [but] ‘[t]his nation, as experience has proved,
cannot always remain at peace . . . .’” (quoting Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 125
(1866))).
52. See Shimon Shetreet, Law and Counter Terror: The Shifting Trends of
Judicial Jurisprudence on Human Rights in the Face of Terror (Dec. 2010)
(unpublished paper delivered at International Conference of Jurists in New
Delhi) (on file with author).
53. See Charkaoui v. Canada, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, 356 (Can.) (finding that
“the lack of review of the detention of foreign nationals” under the Immigration

316

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 305 (2014)

Justice Barak authored opinions for the Israeli High Court in cases
involving torture54 and targeted killings.55 On the general issue of
judicial deference in the face of terror threats, Barak commented:
The security oriented character of administrative discretion
restricted judicial review in the past. Judges are not members of
the security establishment and they should refrain from
interfering in security considerations. Over the years it has
been held that security considerations are not unique insofar as
judicial review is concerned. Judges are not administrators, yet
the principle of separation of powers requires that they review
the lawfulness of administrative decisions. In this regard,
security considerations do not enjoy a different status.56

Optimism is welcome. And predictions of judicial recovery may
well come to pass. But unfortunately, in the past decade, the U.S.
Ship of State has been severely damaged and will require
extensive repairs before it will set sail confidently again. As Justice
Brennan said, the ship will founder again, but the question of the
moment is whether it can even be righted in the short term.
B. U.S. Views on Judicial Independence
Even before the watershed case of Marbury v. Madison,57 the
U.S. Supreme Court had staked out its position on judicial
independence in Chief Justice Jay’s answer to President
Washington’s request for an assessment of the validity of a
particular treaty provision.58 The implication of Jay’s reliance on
and Refugee Protection Act “until 120 days after the reasonableness of the
certificate has been judicially confirmed infringes the guarantee against
arbitrary detention”); A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2004] UKHL 56,
[42], [2005] 2 W.L.R. 87 (Eng.) (rejecting the Attorney General’s argument that
deference owed to Parliament and the executive in the face of national threats
precludes judicial review of the basis for the detention).
54. HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture v. General Security
Service 53 (4) PD 817 [1999] (Isr.).
55. HCJ 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture v. Israel 57(6) PD 285
[2005] (Isr.).
56. H.C. 680/88 Schnitzer v. Chief Military Censor 42(4) P.D. 617 [1989]
(Isr.).
57. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). Marbury recognizes the authority of the Judiciary to
review Executive and Legislative action. Id. at 177.
58. See 3 JOHN JAY, THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY,
1782–1793, at 488 (Henry P. Johnston ed., 1893)
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separation of powers was that the Court could become caught up in
administrative matters and become subject to the political
pressures of the Executive if it entered into giving opinions outside
the course of litigation.
As is now well known, the Supreme Court asserted in
Marbury that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.”59 This statement
followed a lengthy discussion of the difference between discretion
and duty on the part of the Executive60 and another discussion of
the reasons why the legislature cannot be allowed to be the judge
of the validity of its own action.61 Of even more significance for
present purposes, however, is the passage in which Chief Justice
Marshall discussed the role of the judges themselves:
Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to
the constitution of the United States, if that constitution forms
no rule for his government? [I]f it is closed upon him, and
cannot be inspected by him? If such be the real state of things,
this is worse than solemn mockery. To prescribe, or to take
this oath, becomes equally a crime.62

So if a judge refuses to decide a case in which an act of the
Executive is alleged to be illegal, does Marshall mean to say that
it would be a crime for the judge to refuse to decide the case? He
implies something like that a bit later in Cohens v. Virginia63:

[T]he lines of separation drawn by the Constitution between the three
departments of the government. . . . being in certain respects checks
upon each other, and our being judges of a court in the last resort, are
considerations which afford strong arguments against the propriety of
our extra-judicially deciding the questions alluded to . . . .
59. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
60. See id. at 166 (concluding that the Judiciary may examine the acts of a
government officer when “he is directed peremptorily to perform certain acts”
and “the rights of individuals are dependent on the performance of those acts”).
61. See id. at 174 (stating that, if the legislature possessed the authority to
override constitutional provisions, the structures established by the constitution
would be “form without substance”). This discussion borrowed almost verbatim
from THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) without attribution.
62. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803).
63. 19 U.S. 264 (1821) In Cohens, the Court determined that the nature of
federalism does not restrict the judiciary from “construing the words of the
constitution” in reviewing state court constitutional decisions. Id. at 416.
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It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it
should not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction
if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid
a measure because it approaches the confines of the
constitution. We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With
whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be
attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have
no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is
given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the
other would be treason to the constitution.64

From Marshall’s discussion of the “case or controversy”
requirement,65 it is true that the federal courts have drawn some
confines around their own power in the form of requirements for
justiciability. Thus, the courts will not hear a case brought by a
party who has no standing, either because of lack of an “injury
in fact,”66 or because the injury is not “judicially redressable.”67
Nor will the courts hear a “political question,”68 by which the
courts primarily mean a matter that has “a textually
demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch.”69 Nor will
the Court hear a case that is either not yet ripe70 or already
64. Id. at 404.
65. See id. at 305 (distinguishing between the cases over which courts may
exercise their judicial powers from questions that may possess a judicial
character, but do not arise between contesting parties).
66. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (stating
that at a minimum for injury-in-fact the constitution requires the plaintiff to
have suffered “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete
and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”
(citations omitted)); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (phrasing the
proper injury-in-fact inquiry as whether “the injury [is] too abstract, or
otherwise not appropriate, to be considered judicially cognizable”).
67. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1444
(2011) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ taxpayer standing due to the purely speculative
conclusion that any judicial action against “a government expenditure or tax
benefit would result in any actual tax relief” to the plaintiffs (quotations
omitted)); Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976)
(finding that no “case or controversy” exists where the plaintiff has failed to
show that the injury suffered “is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision”).
68. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (explaining that the political
question doctrine arises from the proper distribution of powers between the
separate branches under the constitution).
69. Id. at 216. Although this is only one of six factors listed in Justice
Brennan’s opinion in Baker, on further analysis, this one factor pretty much
subsumes all the others.
70. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979) (Powell, J.,
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moot.71 It is possible to be harshly critical of the standing,
ripeness, and political question doctrine decisions without
denying that the courts have no business injecting themselves
into matters reserved to the political branches. As I have argued
elsewhere, all that the justiciability myth properly stands for is
the proposition that the complainant should lose if the
complainant has no legally cognizable claim.72
None of that bears on the issue of judicial independence.
When it comes to taking direction from the political branches, the
Supreme Court has jealously guarded the freestanding role of the
Article III courts. Perhaps the leading case on this point is
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,73
in which the Court struck down the creation of Bankruptcy
Courts in which judges would exercise judicial power akin to that
of an Article III judge.74
Meanwhile, the Court has upheld the placing of judges on the
U.S. Sentencing Commission,75 has permitted Judicial

concurring) (stating that the political branches cannot seek judicial resolution of
disputes between them until they allow the “normal political process” to resolve
the issue); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89–90 (1947) (“The
power of courts . . . only arises when the interests of litigants require the use of
this judicial authority for their protection against actual interference. A
hypothetical threat is not enough.”).
71. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 317 (1974) (concluding that
when the plaintiff no longer required a decision of the court to compel his
desired outcome, the controversy between the parties lost the “definite and
concrete” character appropriate for judicial resolution); cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 125 (1973) (finding that the termination of the plaintiff’s pregnancy did not
render moot the challenge to Texas’s criminal abortion statute because
pregnancy fell within an exception to the mootness doctrine).
72. See Wayne McCormack, The Justiciability Myth and the Concept of
Law, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 595, 596 (1986) [hereinafter McCormack, The
Justiciability Myth] (asserting that the court’s decision to dismiss a case under a
justiciability doctrine effectively “hides a decision on the merits without
elaborating the reasons behind the decision”).
73. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
74. See id. at 87 (“We conclude that . . . the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, has
impermissibly removed most, if not all, of ‘the essential attributes of the judicial
power’ from the Art. III district court, and has vested those attributes in a nonArt. III adjunct.”).
75. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 404 (1989) (“[W]e conclude
that the principle of separation of powers does not absolutely prohibit Article III
judges from serving on commissions such as that created by the Act.”).
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Conferences to remove judges from hearing cases,76 and has
permitted judges to appoint special prosecutors in politically
sensitive cases.77 In all of these cases, however, the Court
carefully assured itself that the action involved no threat to the
judicial independence of the courts.78
Finally, there is the matter of the “legislative courts,” such as
in the territories and a few specialized “courts” that operate
under the supervision of the Article III courts. The authority for
these entities was found early by Chief Justice Marshall in the
pragmatics of governance structures for territories not yet
admitted to statehood.79 As the Court explained later,
as the absence of a federal structure in the territories
produced problems not foreseen by the Framers of Article III,
the realities of territorial government typically made it less
urgent that judges there enjoy the independence from
Congress and the President envisioned by that article. For the
territories were not ruled immediately from Washington; in a
day of poor roads and slow mails, it was unthinkable that they
should be.80
76. See Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 89
(1970) (implicitly allowing the Judicial Conference’s removal of a judge to stand
by deciding that “petitioner has not made a case for the extraordinary relief of
mandamus or prohibition”).
77. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 676 (1988) (“In this case, however,
we do not think it impermissible for Congress to vest the power to appoint
independent counsel in a specially created federal court.”).
78. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 406 (“[T]he fact that Congress has included
federal judges on the Commission does not itself threaten the integrity of the
Judicial Branch.”); Morrison, 487 U.S. at 684 (“We think both the special court
and its judges are sufficiently isolated . . . so as to avoid any taint of the
independence of the Judiciary such as would render the Act invalid under
Article III.”); Chandler, 398 U.S. at 84 (“There . . . [is an] imperative need for
total and absolute independence of judges . . . . But it is quite another matter to
say that each judge in a complex system shall be the absolute ruler of his
manner of conducting judicial business.”).
79. See Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828)
These Courts, then, are not constitutional Courts, in which the
judicial power conferred by the Constitution on the general
government, can be deposited. They are incapable of receiving it.
They are legislative Courts, created in virtue of the general right of
sovereignty which exists in the government, or in virtue of that clause
which enables Congress to make all needful rules and regulations,
respecting the territory belonging to the United States.
80. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 546 (1962).
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For similar reasons, legislative courts have been created without
life tenure for the judges in military courts-martial81 and the Tax
Court,82 as well as numerous boards of appeals.83 In all of these
situations, the Court has been careful to point out that the
creation of the “court” is either specifically mentioned in Article I
(governance of the armed forces)84 or the court is without general
judicial authority,85 meaning that it is acting only for limited
purposes subject to review by an Article III court.
The bottom line for the purpose of reviewing the judicial
behavior with respect to a particular subject, such as terrorism, is
that the U.S. Judiciary has zealously guarded its independence
from the Executive or Legislative Branches.86 The judges can be
impeached only for misconduct in office.87 Their salaries cannot be
reduced.88 They are bound by judicial ethics not to discuss cases
ex parte.89 They are not even subject to security clearances before
81. See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 179 (1994) (“Congress has . . .
chosen not to give tenure to military judges.”); see also 10 U.S.C. § 826 (2013)
(outlining the roles of military judges).
82. See 26 U.S.C. § 7443(e) (2012) (“The term of office of any judge of the
Tax Court shall expire 15 years after he takes office.”).
83. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 7101A (2012) (Board of Veterans’ Appeals); 5
U.S.C. § 1202 (2012) (Merit Systems Protection Board); 29 U.S.C. § 153 (2012)
(National Labor Relations Board).
84. See, e.g., Weiss, 510 U.S. at 166–67 (“Pursuant to Article I of the
Constitution, Congress has established three tiers of military courts.”).
85. See, e.g., C.I.R. v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 7 (1987) (“The Tax Court is a
court of limited jurisdiction and lacks general equitable powers.”).
86. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 385 (1989) (“These
doctrines help to ensure the independence of the Judicial Branch by precluding
debilitating entanglements between the Judiciary and the two political
Branches . . . .”).
87. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 2 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and
inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour . . . .”).
88. See id. (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall . . .
receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during
their Continuance in Office.”).
89. See Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges, Canon 3(A)(4) (2011), JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/
CodesOfConduct/CodeConductUnitedStatesJudges.aspx (last updated June 2,
2011) [hereinafter Judicial Code of Conduct] (“[A] judge should not initiate,
permit, or consider ex parte communications or consider other communications
concerning a pending or impending matter that are made outside the presence
of the parties or their lawyers.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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receiving classified information in the course of their duties
(although their court personnel are so confined).90 A 1997 ABA
blue-ribbon commission investigated the tension between judicial
independence and accountability.91 The Commission reaffirmed
the importance of keeping the Judiciary free of control by the
political branches, and even went so far as to express concern
that too-harsh and unwarranted criticism of judicial “activism”
could blunt the vitality of the tripartite system.92
Under no circumstances would an Article III judge imagine
being given directions by a member of the Executive Branch.93
Yet, time and again, the courts have yielded to arguments that
decision in a case would jeopardize national security interests
when a neutral observer would be hard-pressed to see how that
could be possible.
C. Judicial Independence and International Law
The International Association of Judicial Independence and
World Peace has promulgated standards demanding that “in the
discharge of his judicial function, a judge is subject to nothing but
the law and the commands of his conscience.”94 Further, judges
90. See United States v. Smith, 899 F.2d 564, 570 (6th Cir. 1990)
[D]istrict courts retain sufficient power to preclude the Executive
from engaging in procedures that intrude upon . . . the judicial
function . . . . We therefore hold that the Executive Branch may
conduct reasonable background investigations, subject to district
court review, of judicial personnel before such personnel are cleared
to work on a case involving classified information.
91. See COMM’N ON SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE,
AM. BAR ASS’N, AN INDEP. JUDICIARY 1 (1997), http://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/government_affairs_office/indepenjud.
authcheckdam.pdf (“The Commission on Separation of Powers and Judicial
Independence was . . . created to study judicial independence and accountability,
to evaluate a number of recent events perceived by some as threatening judicial
independence, and to make recommendations.” (footnote omitted)).
92. See id. at 46 (“[A]ccusations of ‘judicial activism’ have been wielded . . . .
These developments have a potentially deleterious effect on the courts’ decisionmaking independence.”).
93. See, e.g., Smith, 899 F.2d at 569 (“Under no circumstances should the
Judiciary become the handmaiden of the Executive. The independence of the
Judiciary must be jealously guarded at all times against efforts by prosecutors
to erode its authority.”).
94. Mt. Scopus Approved Revised International Standards of Judicial
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“should have unfettered freedom to decide cases impartially, in
accordance with their conscience and their interpretation of the
facts, and in pursuance of the prevailing rules of the law.”95 The
Montreal Declaration of 1983 emphasizes in several ways the
importance to the world community of the Rule of Law and due
process.96
Before going any further, I feel it is important to emphasize
that I see no way in which judges of the United States could be
said to have violated international criminal standards by ceding
so much of their responsibilities to the Executive. It is quite likely
that crimes have been committed by the Executive Branch in the
name of national security. Many observers have called for
prosecution of political leaders, who usually are accused by
detractors of “war crimes”97 although many of the crimes such as
torture and extrajudicial detentions occurred outside any
recognizable context of war. Thus, they should be cognizable
under either ordinary domestic law or international
humanitarian law.
Independence § 2.2.2, INT’L ASS’N OF JUDICIAL INDEP. & WORLD PEACE (Mar. 19,
2008), http://www.jiwp.org/#!mt-scopus-standards/c14de (last visited Feb. 3,
2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
95. Id. § 8.4.
96. See Montreal Declaration, INT’L ASS’N OF JUDICIAL INDEP. AND WORLD
PEACE (June 10, 1983), http://www.jiwp.org/#!montreal-deceleration-1983/cmmd
(last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review)
§ 103 Judges and courts shall be free in the performance of their
duties to ensure that the Rule of Law is observed, and shall not admit
influence from any government or any other authority external to
their statutes and the interests of international justice.
§ 1.05 Judges shall enjoy freedom of thought and, in the exercise of
their duties, shall avoid being influenced by any considerations other
than those of international justice.
§1.08 Judges shall promote the principle of the due process of law as
being an integral part of the independence of justice.
97. See Jordan J. Paust, Prosecuting the President and His Entourage, 14
ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 539, 539 (2008)
During his so-called “war on terror,” President Bush has authorized
and ordered manifest violations of customary and treaty-based
international law . . . . [T]he President’s 2002 memorandum
authorized and ordered the denial of treatment required by the
Geneva Conventions and, therefore, necessarily authorized and
ordered violations of the Geneva Conventions—which are war crimes.
(footnotes omitted).
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The question to be answered here is whether the judges who
refused to grant relief against the wrongful actions of government
officials could be charged with criminal behavior. The most
salient precedent, of course, is the Justice Case98 from Military
Tribunal #3 at Nuremberg. The United States convened a
Military Tribunal for the purpose of prosecuting sixteen judges
who were charged with having been complicit in the crimes
against humanity committed by the Nazi regime.99 Specifically,
they were charged with participating in the “common design or
conspiracy” of racial persecution.100 According to the indictment,
5. It was a part of the said common design, conspiracy, plans,
and enterprises to enact, issue, enforce, and give effect to
certain purported statutes, decrees, and orders, which were
criminal both in inception and execution, and to work with the
Gestapo, SS, SD, SIPO, and RSHA for criminal purposes, in
the course of which the defendants, by distortion and denial of
judicial and penal process, committed the murders, brutalities,
cruelties, tortures, atrocities, and other inhumane acts . . . .

98. The Library of Congress website contains in one volume all the
pleadings, the transcript, and the court opinions. III TRIAL OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS (1951) [hereinafter NUREMBERG
TRIALS],
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_VolIII.pdf.
99. See generally INGO MULLER, HITLER’S JUSTICE (1991). This trial served
as the model for the fictitious version in the movie Judgment at Nuremberg. In
particular, the movie explored the ethical dilemma of a judge who stayed in
office and sentenced some people to death because he believed that his
resignation would result in the appointment of an even more brutal adherent of
the regime. That character was based on Judge Schlegelberger. See Michael
Asimow, Judges Judging Judges—Judgment at Nuremberg, U.S.F. (1998),
http://usf.usfca.edu/pj//articles/Nuremberg.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2014)
(“Judgment at Nuremberg is based on the third Nuremberg trial . . . . Janning is
a conglomeration of several actual defendants, including Franz Schlegelberger
who was formerly undersecretary in the Ministry of Justice.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
100. See NUREMBERG TRIALS, supra note 98, at 15
The United States of America . . . charges that the defendants herein
participated in a common design or conspiracy to commit and did
commit war crimes and crimes against humanity, as defined in
Control Council Law No. 10, duly enacted by the Allied Control
Council on 20 December 1945. These crimes included murders,
brutalities, cruelties, tortures, atrocities, plunder of private property,
and other inhumane acts, as set forth in counts one, two, and three of
this indictment.
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7. The said common design, conspiracy, plans, and enterprises
embraced the use of the judicial process as a powerful weapon
for the persecution and extermination of all opponents of the
Nazi regime regardless of nationality and for the persecution
and extermination of “races.”101

Evidence in the case was heard over a period of eleven
months and resulted in a 10,000-page transcript with hundreds of
written exhibits along with oral testimony.102 In essence, ten of
the judges were found to have taken an active part in the
Holocaust events,103 some by drafting legislation granting special
powers to the regime,104 some by replacing judges who were not
compliant,105 and some by issuing death sentences that were
manifestly unwarranted by the evidence in the individual
cases.106 The most interesting aspect of the case involved the role
of Judge Schlegelberger, a very prominent member of the
Judiciary who “was put in charge of the Reich Ministry of Justice
as administrative Secretary of State” but eventually resigned.107
He testified that he often found the demands of the Nazi Party to
be “difficult,” but there was evidence that “Hitler was at least
attempting to reward Schlegelberger for good and faithful service
rendered in the performance of some of which Schlegelberger
committed both war crimes and crimes against humanity as
charged in the indictment.”108
As an example of his support for the regime’s dispensing with
the Rule of Law, the court cited a speech in which Schlegelberger
stated:
In the sphere of criminal law the road to a creation of justice in
harmony with the moral concepts of the new Reich has been
opened up by a new wording of section 2 of the criminal code,
whereby a person is also (to) be punished even if his deed is
not punishable according to the law, but if he deserves
punishment in accordance with the basic concepts of criminal
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 17–18.
Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 1021.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 1082.
Id.
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law and the sound instincts of the people. This new definition
became necessary because of the rigidity of the norm in force
hitherto.109

The Tribunal had this to say about his defense:
Schlegelberger presents an interesting defense, which is also
claimed in some measure by most of the defendants. He
asserts that the administration of justice was under persistent
assault by Himmler and other advocates of the police state.
This is true. He contends that if the functions of the
administration of justice were usurped by the lawless forces
under Hitler and Himmler, the last state of the nation would
be worse than the first. He feared that if he were to resign, a
worse man would take his place. As the event proved, there is
much truth in this also. Under Thierack the police did usurp
the functions of the administration of justice and murdered
untold thousands of Jews and political prisoners. Upon
analysis this plausible claim of the defense squares neither
with the truth, logic, or the circumstances.
The evidence conclusively shows that in order to maintain
the Ministry of Justice in the good graces of Hitler and to
prevent its utter defeat by Himmler's police, Schlegleberger
and the other defendants who joined in this claim of
justification took over the dirty work which the leaders of the
State demanded, and employed the Ministry of Justice as a
means for exterminating the Jewish and Polish populations,
terrorizing the inhabitants of occupied countries, and wiping
out political opposition at home. That their program of racial
extermination under the guise of law failed to attain the
proportions which were reached by the pogroms, deportations,
and mass murders by the police is cold comfort to the survivors
of the "judicial" process and constitutes a poor excuse before
this Tribunal. The prostitution of a judicial system for the
accomplishment of criminal ends involves an element of evil to
the State which is not found in frank atrocities which do not
sully judicial robes.
Schlegelberger resigned. The cruelties of the system
which he had helped to develop were too much for him, but he
resigned too late. The damage was done. If the judiciary could
slay their thousands, why couldn't the police slay their tens of
thousands? The consequences which Schlegelberger feared
were realized. The police, aided by Thierack, prevailed.
Schlegelbergcr had failed. His hesitant injustices no longer
109.

Id.
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satisfied the urgent demands of the hour. He retired under
fire. In spite of all that he had done he still bore an unmerited
reputation as the last of the German jurists and so Hitler gave
him his blessing and 100,000 RM as a parting gift. We are
under no misapprehension. Schlegelberger is a tragic
character. He loved the life of intellect, the work of the scholar.
We believe that he loathed the evil that he did, but he sold
that intellect and that scholarship to Hitler for a mess of
political pottage and for the vain hope of personal security. He
is guilty [of war crimes and crimes against humanity] . . . .110

This is a harsh judgment suited to harsh measures. In the
United States of the past decade, despite the torture, the
unjustified detentions, the unauthorized surveillance, and the
targeted killings, it would not be credible to argue that a U.S.
judge had participated in the “prostitution of a judicial system for
the accomplishment of criminal ends.”111 For some reason, the
Nazi regime enlisted the support of the Judiciary in its nefarious
doings, a step that has not been taken in the U.S. terrorism
context except for the highly questionable seeking of a FISA
Court ruling that all electronic communications are “relevant” to
terrorism investigations.112
Moreover, the level of the atrocities committed in the Nazi
Holocaust far outstrip the level of wrongdoing by the United
States, although torture is still torture, whether one person or
many. The difference, again, is that the U.S. courts have not been
active participants in the wrongs—they have simply failed to
prevent them—and if we ever encountered a threat of atrocities
at the level of the Holocaust, even the most pessimistic observer
could hope that the U.S. Judiciary would stand up and say “NO.”
110. Id. at 1086–87.
111. Id.
112. See In re F.B.I. for an Order Requiring Prod. of Tangible Things From,
BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5307991, at *7 (FISA Ct. Sept. 13, 2013)
The government notes also that “[a]nalysts know that the terrorists’
communications are located somewhere” in the metadata produced
under this authority, but cannot know where until the data is
aggregated and then accessed . . . . As the government stated in its
2006 Memorandum of Law, “[a]ll of the metadata collected is thus
relevant, because the success of this investigative tool depends on
bulk collection.”
(citations omitted). This is a matter of privacy law that will be taken up under
the heading of “Carte Blance for Electronic Snooping” below. Infra Part IV.F.
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Some judges in the past decade turned blind eyes to the
wrongs displayed before them.113 Some paid undue deference to
the Executive.114 And at least one, Justice Scalia, skirted the
bounds of propriety115 when he said the judgment of his
colleagues would “cause more Americans to be killed.”116
I think we can safely conclude that the examples of deference
and the tolerance for wrongdoing by American judges in the past
decade do not amount to criminal behavior under the standards
of either domestic or international law. There is no hint that any
judge has sentenced a person to an unwarranted death or
imprisonment, nor has any judge been directly involved in the
acquisition of excessive executive power.117 The most that can be
said is that many judges have failed to stand firmly against
encroachments on their traditional role of judicial review. I don’t
see that as a violation of criminal standards.
IV. Avoiding Accountability
As indicated above, there are a variety of doctrines that have
been used to keep the courts away from reviewing governmental
actions in the name of combating terrorism. I want to review the
use of the following six doctrines:
1. Deference
2. State Secrets Privilege (SSP)
3. Qualified Immunity
113. See Geoffrey R. Stone, National Security v. Civil Liberties, 95 CAL. L.
REV. 2203, 2203 (2007) (“[J]udges have . . . presumed—seemingly sensibly—that
the actions of military and executive officials were constitutional whenever they
acted in the name of national security.”).
114. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 899 F.2d 564, 569 (6th Cir. 1990)
(“[T]he Court has deferred to the judgment of the Executive to preserve national
security . . . .”).
115. See Judicial Code of Conduct, supra note 89, at Canon 3(A)(3) (“A judge
should be patient, dignified, respectful, and courteous to litigants, jurors,
witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom the judge deals in an official
capacity.”).
116. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 828 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117. Judge Bybee of the Ninth Circuit signed the infamous Yoo memoranda
before he was appointed to the bench. Was there a political trade-off in
obtaining his signature? Probably not anything overt, just the usual political
cronyism of Washington politics.
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4. “Special Factors” Exception
5. “Special Need” Exception
6. Standing
A. Deference
The word “deference” appears frequently in describing the
judicial attitude toward an executive or legislative decision.118 As
a general matter, there is nothing wrong with the idea of
deference, although we need to distinguish among deference to
findings of fact, deference to policy decisions, and deference on
matters of law. It makes sense that a reviewing court accepts the
factual findings of a political body if there is any “rational basis”
for those findings.119 The most familiar example here is that the
Supreme Court was able to find some evidentiary support for the
proposition that a farmer’s use of homegrown wheat for
commercial purposes affected interstate demand for wheat, and
thus upheld federal regulation of homegrown wheat.120 Within
118. See, e.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) (“When faced with a
problem of statutory construction, this Court shows great deference to the
interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its
administration.”).
119. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464
(1981) (“States are not required to convince the courts of the correctness of their
legislative judgments. Rather, ‘those challenging the legislative judgment must
convince the court that the legislative facts on which the classification is
apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the
governmental decisionmaker.’” (citations omitted)); see also Day-Brite Lighting
Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 425 (1952) (“The judgment of the legislature that
time out for voting should cost the employee nothing may be a debatable
one . . . . But if our recent cases mean anything, they leave debatable issues as
respects business, economic, and social affairs to legislative decision.”);
Henderson Co. v. Thompson, 300 U.S. 258, 264–65 (1937) (“No facts have been
found, or established by the evidence, which would justify us in pronouncing the
action of the Legislature arbitrary . . . . The classification made has ample
support in the evidence. We are unable to find in the regulation anything
arbitrary or unreasonable.”).
120. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (stating Congress may
regulate an activity “if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce”); cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995) (stating the
Court should undertake to decide whether a rational basis exists for concluding
that a regulated activity sufficiently affects interstate commerce instead of
accepting an unsupported conclusion by Congress that a particular activity
substantially affects interstate commerce).
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the realm of judicial review but still entitled to a significant level
of deference would be Congressional findings that a particular
activity has a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce.121 This
form of deference is merely an expression of the degree to which a
court is going to look behind findings of legislative fact by the
body appropriately given responsibility for making those
findings.122
Similarly, acceptance of legislative policy decisions is simply
recognition of the appropriate legislative role.123 An extreme
example at the policy level would be a court’s acceptance of the
legislature’s decision on the level of taxation for a particular
activity—in that situation, we would go so far as to say that the
decision is “committed to the authority of a coordinate branch”
and conclude that it is a “political question” unfit for judicial
review at all.124
Other examples of deference occur in the realm of executive
dealings in foreign affairs.125 The extreme is the unfettered
121. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17, 22 (2005) (stating that the
Congress has the “power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an
economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce” and the Court only had to determine whether Congress had a
“rational basis” to regulate the same); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 261–62 (1964) (stating that it “is within the sound and
exclusive discretion of the Congress” to remove obstructions in commerce,
however “it is subject only to one caveat” which is “that the means chosen by it
must be reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution”).
122. See Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 22 (“In assessing the scope of Congress’
authority under the Commerce Clause, we stress that the task before us is a
modest one. We need not determine whether respondents’ activities, taken in
the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether
a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.”).
123. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398–99 (1937) (stating
“the Legislature was entitled to adopt measures to reduce the evils of the
‘sweating system’ . . . [e]ven if the wisdom of the policy be regarded as
debatable” as long as it is not “arbitrary and capricious”).
124. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it; [or one of several other factors that all add up essentially to the
same point that there is no “law” for a court to apply to the claim].
125. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319
(1936) (claiming broadly that the President is the “sole organ of the nation in its
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ability of the President to recognize one entity as the legitimate
government of another country.126 Congress has stated in no
uncertain terms that the President has sole authority to control
the export of arms to other countries127 and the courts have held
in equally certain terms that they will not second-guess those
decisions.128 Most relevant to the current issue are the authority
of the State Department129 and Office of Foreign Asset Control to
external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations” (citation
omitted)).
126. This power derives from the constitutional authority to “receive
ambassadors,” and is rather universally recognized as solely within the domain
of the President. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1007 (1979) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (relying on the ground that “the Constitution commits to the
President alone the power to recognize, and withdraw recognition from, foreign
regimes”). The presidential power to recognize one entity as the legitimate
government of another nation was discussed in detail by the lower court. See
Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 707–08 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“It is undisputed
that the Constitution gave the President full constitutional authority to
recognize the PRC and to derecognize the ROC.” (footnote omitted)).
127. See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (2012) (“[T]he President is authorized to
control the import and the export of defense articles and defense services and to
provide foreign policy guidance to persons of the United States involved in the
export and import of such articles and services.”).
128. See United States v. Hsu, 364 F.3d 192, 194 (4th Cir. 2004) (“The Arms
Export Control Act . . . authorizes the President to ‘designate those items which
shall be considered as defense articles,’ and ‘promulgate regulations . . . .’”
(citations omitted)); United States v. Lee, 183 F.3d 1029, 1032 (9th Cir. 1999)
(“The statute under which Lee and Ray were convicted, 22 U.S.C. § 2778,
authorizes the President to control the import and export of defense
articles . . . .”); United States v. Gregg, 829 F.2d 1430, 1434 (8th Cir. 1987)
There may be ambiguities and vagueness in these policy objectives,
but the task of weighing and balancing the conflicting factors is
committed by Congress to Executive discretion. As explained clearly
by judge Zobel in United States v. Moller-Butcher, 560 F. Supp. 550
(D. Mass. 1983), Congress enumerated the factors which are to guide
the discretion of the executive department, but “also clearly expressed
its desire that the executive branch, not the courts, have the final
word on which items should be restricted.”
See also Cody Jones, Note, More Than an Assertion: How United States v.
Pulungan Nudged the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls Toward Increased
Transparency, 64 OKLA. L. REV. 839, 846 (2012) (“Congress ‘clearly expressed its
desire that the executive branch, not the courts, have the final word on which
items should be restricted.’” (footnote omitted)).
129. The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996
allowed the State Department to designate “foreign terrorist organization[s]” as
to whom provision of any “material support” would become criminal under 18
U.S.C. § 2339B. 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2004).
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designate persons and organizations as terrorist so that any
transactions with them are criminal.130 The courts have repeatedly
deferred to these designations based on the fact-finding ability of
the agency,131 although there are due process concerns that allow
designated organizations to rebut the allegations against them.132
The most troubling aspect of this particular deference is the use of
“classified information” by agencies making the designation, to
which the courts have responded that the organization must have
at least an opportunity to rebut the allegations against it, but thus
far the cases have found sufficient basis in the public record to
support the designations.133 This subject appeared in the
discussion of “asset forfeiture” above.134
With the exception of the terrorism designation cases, the
examples above are thoroughly understandable and justifiable
judicial deference to Executive or Legislative determinations.
130. See International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1701–1705 (2012) (granting sweeping power to the President).
131. See United States v. Afshari, 392 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004) (“That
court may set aside the designation for the ordinary administrative law reasons,
such as that the designation is ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.’” (footnote omitted)); People’s Mojahedin
Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (stating that
“even the unclassified record taken alone is quite adequate to support the
Secretary’s determination” under AEDPA); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev.
v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 162 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“The district court correctly
reviewed the actions of the Treasury Department under the highly deferential
‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard . . . . Treasury’s decision to designate HLF as
an SDGT was based on ample evidence in a massive administrative record.”).
132. See Afshari, 392 F.3d at 1040 (“Leaving the determination to the
Executive Branch, coupled with the procedural protections and judicial review
afforded by the statute, is both a reasonable and a constitutional way to make a
determination of whether a group is a ‘foreign terrorist organization.’”); People’s
Mojahedin Org. of Iran, 327 F.3d at 1242 (stating there are “due process
standards that the Secretary must meet in making designations” under the
AEDPA); Holy Land Found., 333 F.3d at 164 (“Treasury provided HLF with the
requisite notice and opportunity for response necessary to satisfy due process
requirements.”).
133. See People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran, 327 F.3d at 1243 (“[E]ven the
unclassified record taken alone is quite adequate to support the Secretary’s
determination” under AEDPA); Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of
State, 251 F.3d 192, 199 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“We have, as the statute mandates,
reviewed the administrative record . . . . We conclude that the Secretary’s
designation of the National Council of Resistance as an alias for the PMOI does
not lack substantial support . . . .”).
134. Supra Part II.F.
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Many of the statements of deference that have been made in the
realm of combating terrorism similarly are understandable and
justifiable, but the degree of deference over time has reached a
disturbing level.
The difference is that the courts have refused to apply law
that is applicable, have refused even to ask whether there is law to
be applied, and in some instances have at least implied (if not
outright stated) that law can be sublimated to the goal of
security.135 When deference turns to obsequiousness, the judiciary
has forfeited its role of independent judicial review. This point
essentially is the flip side of Justice Jackson’s famous dissent in
Korematsu v. United States136: “If the people ever let command of
the war power fall into irresponsible and unscrupulous hands, the
courts wield no power equal to its restraint.”137
Now instead of the people ceding power to the President, we
have seen the courts ceding power to the President, which may
require that “We the People” reclaim those powers.
B. The Detention Cases
1. “Enemy Combatant” and Guantanamo Detentions
Yaser Hamdi was one of two U.S. citizens to appear before the
Supreme Court in 2004.138 He was picked up in Afghanistan by
135. For an example of this, see Judge Wilkinson’s comments with regard to
an extrajudicial domestic detention far removed from any realistic notion of a
“battlefield”:
For courts to resist this political attempt to meet these rising dangers
risks making the judiciary the most dangerous branch . . . . The
advance and democratization of technology proceeds apace, and our
legal system must show some recognition of these changing
circumstances. In other words, law must reflect the actual nature of
modern warfare.
Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 293 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (per curiam)
(Wilkinson, J., concurring and dissenting), vacated sub nom. Al-Marri v.
Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 (2009). This case is discussed further below. Infra Part
IV.C.2.
136. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
137. Id. at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
138. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004) (“This case arises out
of the detention of a man whom the Government alleges took up arms with the
Taliban during this conflict. His name is Yaser Esam Hamdi.”).
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Northern Alliance forces around the same time and area as John
Walker Lindh.139 While Lindh was taken directly to the Eastern
District of Virginia (landing at Andrews Air Force Base),140 Hamdi
was first taken to Guantanamo and then transported to Naval
Brigs first at Norfolk, Virginia, and then at Charleston, South
Carolina.141 He was initially held incommunicado, and his father
filed a habeas corpus petition on his behalf.142 Although his case
does not deal with Guantanamo, the subsequent cases dealing
with that unfortunate locale are more easily understood with an
initial look at this extrajudicial detention of a citizen by the
military.
Initially, the Fourth Circuit granted total deference to the
Government on the basis that “because it was ‘undisputed that
Hamdi was captured in a zone of active combat in a foreign
theater of conflict,’ no factual inquiry or evidentiary hearing
allowing Hamdi to be heard or rebut the Government’s assertions
was necessary or proper.”143 To this, the Supreme Court
responded:
First, the Government urges the adoption of the Fourth
Circuit’s holding below—that because it is “undisputed” that
Hamdi’s seizure took place in a combat zone, the habeas
determination can be made purely as a matter of law, with no
further hearing or factfinding necessary. This argument is
easily rejected. . . . [T]he circumstances surrounding Hamdi’s
seizure cannot in any way be characterized as “undisputed,” as
“those circumstances are neither conceded in fact, nor
susceptible to concession in law, because Hamdi has not been
permitted to speak for himself or even through counsel as to
those circumstances.”144

The more serious claim for deference came out of the
language of “war” that the Government adopted to cover all

139. Id.; United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 547 (E.D. Va. 2002).
140. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 547.
141. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510.
142. Id. at 511.
143. Id. at 514 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 473 (4th Cir.
2003)).
144. Id. at 526 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 357 (4th Cir.
2003) (Luttig, J., dissenting)).
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instances of detention for alleged collaborators with hostile
groups:
The Government’s second argument requires closer
consideration. This is the argument that further factual
exploration is unwarranted and inappropriate in light of the
extraordinary constitutional interests at stake. Under the
Government’s most extreme rendition of this argument,
“[r]espect for separation of powers and the limited
institutional capabilities of courts in matters of military
decision-making in connection with an ongoing conflict” ought
to eliminate entirely any individual process, restricting the
courts to investigating only whether legal authorization exists
for the broader detention scheme. At most, the Government
argues, courts should review its determination that a citizen is
an enemy combatant under a very deferential “some evidence”
standard. . . .
In response, Hamdi emphasizes that this Court
consistently has recognized that an individual challenging his
detention may not be held at the will of the Executive without
recourse to some proceeding before a neutral tribunal to
determine whether the Executive’s asserted justifications for
that detention have basis in fact and warrant in law. He
argues that the Fourth Circuit inappropriately “ceded power to
the Executive during wartime to define the conduct for which
a citizen may be detained, judge whether that citizen has
engaged in the proscribed conduct, and imprison that citizen
indefinitely,” and that due process demands that he receive a
hearing in which he may challenge the [government’s
conclusions] and adduce his own counterevidence.145

Conceding that “[b]oth of these positions highlight legitimate
concerns,” the O’Connor plurality then proceeded to balance the
competing interests.146 In doing so, it concluded that Hamdi was
not entitled to the full procedural protections of a criminal
proceeding because of “the weighty and sensitive governmental
interests in ensuring that those who have in fact fought with the
enemy during a war do not return to battle.”147 The plurality went
along with the Government’s assertions that “burdens” on
military officials could be “properly taken into account”148—those
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 527–28 (citations omitted).
Id. at 531.
Id.
Id. at 532.
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burdens consisting of distraction to commanders in the field and
the prospect that “discovery into military operations would both
intrude on the sensitive secrets of national defense and result in
a futile search for evidence buried under the rubble of war.”149
Giving deference to these concerns of the military, balanced
against the interests of freedom for Hamdi, the plurality came up
with a hybrid sort of due process holding:
We therefore hold that a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge
his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice
of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity
to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral
decisionmaker. . . .
At the same time, the exigencies of the circumstances
may demand that, aside from these core elements, enemycombatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their
uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of
ongoing military conflict. Hearsay, for example, may need to
be accepted as the most reliable available evidence from the
Government in such a proceeding. Likewise, the Constitution
would not be offended by a presumption in favor of the
Government’s evidence, so long as that presumption remained
a rebuttable one and fair opportunity for rebuttal were
provided.150

An observer might consider this holding a victory for due
process and judicial review, but wait: there were two Justices
who believed that the legislature had not authorized nonjudicial
Executive detention of a citizen on U.S. soil.151 And in what has to
be one of the oddest pairings in Supreme Court history, Justices
Scalia and Stevens dissented sharply on the basis of British
history known to the Founders, as “due process” in that context
meant that a citizen accused of criminal conduct was entitled to
the full procedural panoplies of a criminal trial.152 So there were
actually four votes for immediate remanding of Hamdi to the civil
authorities for trial along with the four votes of the plurality for
habeas corpus review.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 533–34 (citations omitted).
151. See id. at 542–54 (Ginsburg and Souter, J.J., concurring) (arguing that
the Non-Detention Act did not authorize Hamdi’s detention).
152. See id. at 555–58 (describing the evolution of due process, and also the
writ of habeas corpus as a remedy originating in Renaissance England).
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So why the diluted form of due process endorsed by the
plurality rather than the rigorous version of due process endorsed
by the other four? The answer lies in the procedures of the Court:
if left to a 4–4 vote, the Court would have to affirm the lower
court by a divided vote.153 That would have left the Fourth
Circuit’s total deferential approach in place and left Hamdi with
no remedy whatsoever. Therefore, Justice Souter joined by
Justice Ginsburg reluctantly voted with the plurality to “remand
on terms closest to those I would impose.”154
The companion case to Hamdi that deals with Guantanamo
detainees is Rasul v. Bush.155 This time, Justice Stevens was able
to command a majority of the Court (minus Justice Scalia) to the
view that the Guantanamo detainees were entitled to proceed in
federal court under habeas corpus.156 The crux of the matter was
that Guantanamo is essentially U.S. territory and prisoners on
our soil are entitled to some form of due process.157 The most
significant case to be distinguished was a World War II case,
Johnson v. Eisentrager,158 in which German soldiers were denied
access to habeas corpus following their trial and imprisonment in
Germany.159 According to the Court in Rasul:
Petitioners in these cases differ from the Eisentrager detainees
in important respects: They are not nationals of countries at
war with the United States, and they deny that they have
153. See H. Ron Davidson, The Mechanics of Judicial Vote Switching,
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 17, 19–20 (2004) (noting that, in the event of a 4–4 tie
between Justices, the affirmation default rule applies and the court confirms the
lower court’s ruling in a per curiam opinion).
154. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 553 (2004).
155. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
156. Id. at 481–84 (“Application of the habeas statute to persons detained at
the base is consistent with the historical reach of the writ of habeas corpus. . . .
We therefore hold that § 2241 confers on the District Court jurisdiction to hear
petitioners’ habeas corpus challenges to the legality of their detention at the
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.”).
157. See id. at 480–81 (explaining that the United States has jurisdiction
over Guantanamo and arguing aliens held in federal custody, like American
citizens, are entitled to invoke the habeas statue).
158. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
159. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475 (finding that “a Federal District Court
lacked authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to 21 German citizens who had
been captured by U.S. forces in China, tried and Convicted of war crimes, . . .
and incarcerated in the Landsberg Prison in occupied Germany”).
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engaged in or plotted acts of aggression against the United
States; they have never been afforded access to any tribunal,
much less charged with and convicted of wrongdoing; and for
more than two years they have been imprisoned in territory
over which the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction
and control.160

Indeed, the language of Eisentrager was sufficiently
ambiguous that the case could stand for the proposition that the
German prisoners had received habeas review and been found to
have received all the due process to which they were entitled.
In conclusion, Justice Stevens’ majority opinion merely
stated that the federal courts had jurisdiction to hear the habeas
corpus petitions from Guantanamo detainees.161 It set out no
criteria for when detentions would be held invalid.162 In a mere
footnote, the Court held:
Petitioners’ allegations—that, although they have engaged
neither in combat nor in acts of terrorism against the United
States, they have been held in Executive detention for more
than two years in territory subject to the long-term, exclusive
jurisdiction and control of the United States, without access to
counsel and without being charged with any wrongdoing—
unquestionably describe “custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”163

The third executive detention case in the 2004 set was a
habeas corpus petition brought on behalf of Jose Padilla, a U.S.
citizen arrested at O’Hare Airport for allegedly plotting to place a
“dirty bomb” somewhere in the United States.164 After Hamdi, it
would seem that Padilla’s case would be a slam dunk because he
was not anywhere near a “battlefield,” unless one believed the

160. Id. at 476.
161. See id. at 485 (“What is presently at stake is only whether federal
courts have jurisdiction to determine the legality of the Executive’s potentially
indefinite detention of individuals who claim to be wholly innocent of
wrongdoing. Answering that question in the affirmative, we reverse . . . and
remand . . . .”).
162. See id. (“Whether and what further proceedings may become necessary
after respondents make their response to the merits of petitioners’ claims are
matters that we need not address now.”).
163. Id. at 483 n.15 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2012)).
164. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
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politicians who talked as if the whole world were a battlefield.165
In a masterpiece of ducking, however, the Court decided that his
habeas petition was brought in the wrong court because it was
filed by his New York counsel in New York two days after he had
been transferred to the Navy Brig in South Carolina.166 There,
Padilla would languish for almost four years in isolation before he
was finally brought to trial on criminal charges167—more on that
abuse of the system later.
The next act in the drama of Guantanamo occurred two years
later in 2006, when the Court determined that the military
commissions established to try war crime allegations at
Guantanamo were improperly constituted under both domestic
and international law.168 The case that reached the Court
involved a charge of “conspiracy” against one of Osama bin
Laden’s former drivers, prompting a ruling that the concept of
“conspiracy” was not part of the “law of war.”169 The Executive
plea for deviation from the procedural requirements of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)170 was unpersuasive.
“Exigency alone, of course, will not justify the establishment and
use of penal tribunals not contemplated by Article I, § 8, and
Article III, § 1, of the Constitution unless some other part of that
document authorizes a response to the felt need.”171
165. A wide-ranging critique of this notion shows that it did not end with the
Bush Administration but has continued under President Obama. See Indefinite
Detention: The World Is Not a Battlefield, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION,
http://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/theworldisnotabattlefield/ (last visited
Feb. 3, 2014) (noting that the Obama administration “has also claimed the
authority to hold terrorism suspects in indefinite military detention”) (on file
with the Washington & Lee Law Review).
166. Padilla, 542 U.S. at 441.
167. Judge Agrees Padilla Terror Case ‘Light on Facts,’ ASSOCIATED PRESS,
June 21, 2006, www.nbcnews.com/id/13462968/#.61JeBBaW2k (last updated
June 21, 2006, 2:26 PM) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
168. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 613 (2006) (deciding that the
President’s military commission lacked the power to try Hamdan and that the
procedures the Government decreed would govern Hamdan’s trial by
commission violate the UCMJ and American common law of war).
169. Id. at 567 (summarizing Hamdan’s argument that trial by military
commission for conspiracy is improper as conspiracy is not a violation of the law
of war).
170. 10 U.S.C. §§ 830–854 (2012).
171. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 591 (citations omitted).
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The Government argued that military necessity mandated
the need for a military commission with unusual authority, such
as the ability to allow hearsay evidence and the ability to
determine inadequate independence of counsel.172 The UCMJ
provided Congressional authority for military commissions so
long as the commission procedures were “the same as those
applied to courts-martial unless such uniformity proves
impracticable.”173 The Government urged several aspects of
deference to the Executive determination that the military
commissions could dispense with procedural safeguards:
Finally, the President’s determination that “the danger to the
safety of the United States and the nature of international
terrorism” renders it impracticable “to apply in military
commissions . . . the principles of law and the rules of evidence
generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the
United States district courts,” is, in the Government’s view,
explanation enough for any deviation from court-martial
procedures.174

The majority opinion by Justice Stevens responded to this
argument with mere disbelief:
Nothing in the record before us demonstrates that it would be
impracticable to apply court-martial rules in this case. There
is no suggestion, for example, of any logistical difficulty in
securing properly sworn and authenticated evidence or in
applying
the
usual
principles
of
relevance
and
admissibility. . . . [T]he only reason offered in support of that
determination is the danger posed by international terrorism.
Without for one moment underestimating that danger, it is not
evident to us why it should require, in the case of Hamdan’s
trial, any variance from the rules that govern courts-martial.
The absence of any showing of impracticability is
particularly disturbing when considered in light of the clear
and admitted failure to apply one of the most fundamental

172. See id. at 622 (describing the Government’s arguments that military
commissions would be of no use if they were “hamstrung” by the provisions of
the UCMJ that govern courts-martial and that the nature of terrorism renders
impracticable the procedures and evidentiary rules used in U.S. criminal cases).
173. Id. at 620.
174. Id. at 622 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 43–47, Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184), 2006 WL 460875).
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protections afforded not just by the Manual for Courts-Martial
but also by the UCMJ itself: the right to be present.175

These comments are probably the high-water mark of judicial
resistance to demands for deference in relationship to terrorism.
After this decision, Congress adopted the Military Commission
Act of 2006 (MCA),176 in which it not only defined a complete
catalog of offenses against the “law of nations,” but also
attempted to validate some of the procedural objections to the
commissions.177 The list of offenses included both “conspiracy”
and “material support” of terrorism and terrorist organizations.178
Hamdan was then tried and acquitted of the conspiracy charge
but found guilty of material support.179 He was sentenced to
sixty-six months in prison but had already served sixty-one.180 By
the time a deal was negotiated for repatriation to his native
Yemen, his sentence had only one month left to run, which he
served back home and is now free.181 The final twist in this
bizarre scenario is that the D.C. Circuit ultimately reversed his
conviction for material support on the ground that it was not a
crime under either domestic or international law at the time he
was active with al Qaeda.182
The third step in the Supreme Court’s handling of
Guantanamo cases is Boumediene v. Bush,183 which provides a

175. Id. at 623–24 (footnotes omitted).
176. Military Commission Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600
(2006) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948 (2012)).
177. See id. § 948(b)–(d) (2012) (establishing the general purpose and
authority of military commissions as well as their jurisdiction and persons
subject to them).
178. Id. § 950(t).
179. William Glaberson, Panel Convicts Bin Laden Driver in Split Verdict,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2008, at A1.
180. Charlie Savage, In Setback for Military Tribunal, Bin Laden Driver’s
Conviction is Reversed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2012, at A22.
181. Robert Worth, Bin Laden Driver to Be Sent to Yemen, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
26, 2008), www.nytimes.com/2008/11/26/washington/26gitmo.html?ref=world
(last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
182. See Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (finding
that because the Military Commission Act cannot be applied ex post facto to
Hamdan’s actions, and because his actions were not otherwise illegal when
committed, he could not be found guilty).
183. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
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measure of judicial review over the Guantanamo detainees,184 but
also provides the low-water mark for judicial independence in the
form of Justice Scalia’s most injudicious dissent.185 Justice
Kennedy, not surprisingly after his concurring opinion in
Hamdan, wrote the majority for the Court in reviewing the
validity of the MCA:
Petitioners present a question not resolved by our earlier cases
relating to the detention of aliens at Guantanamo: whether
they have the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus, a
privilege not to be withdrawn except in conformance with the
Suspension Clause, Art. I, § 9, cl. 2. We hold these petitioners
do have the habeas corpus privilege. Congress has enacted a
statute, the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), that
provides certain procedures for review of the detainees’ status.
We hold that those procedures are not an adequate and
effective substitute for habeas corpus. Therefore § 7 of the
Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA) operates as an
unconstitutional suspension of the writ. We do not address
whether the President has authority to detain these
petitioners nor do we hold that the writ must issue. These and
other questions regarding the legality of the detention are to
be resolved in the first instance by the District Court.186

Justice Kennedy provided this insight into why judicial
review, as opposed to the careful and informed review by military
experts, is crucial to sustained detention:
Where a person is detained by executive order, rather than,
say, after being tried and convicted in a court, the need for
collateral review is most pressing. A criminal conviction in the
usual course occurs after a judicial hearing before a tribunal
disinterested in the outcome and committed to procedures
designed to ensure its own independence. These dynamics are
not inherent in executive detention orders or executive review
procedures.187

184. See id. at 771 (holding “Art. 1, §9, cl.2 of the Constitutions has full
effect at Guantanamo Bay[,]” and therefore, prisoners there are entitled to
habeas review).
185. Id. at 826 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 732 (majority opinion) (citations omitted).
187. Id. at 783.
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Finally, Justice Kennedy had some comments regarding the
relative roles of executive and judiciary in dealing with public
safety:
In considering both the procedural and substantive standards
used to impose detention to prevent acts of terrorism, proper
deference must be accorded to the political branches. Unlike
the President and some designated Members of Congress,
neither the Members of this Court nor most federal judges
begin the day with briefings that may describe new and
serious threats to our Nation and its people. The law must
accord the Executive substantial authority to apprehend and
detain those who pose a real danger to our security.
Officials charged with daily operational responsibility for
our security may consider a judicial discourse on the history of
the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 and like matters to be far
removed from the Nation’s present, urgent concerns.
Established legal doctrine, however, must be consulted for its
teaching. Remote in time it may be; irrelevant to the present it
is not. Security depends upon a sophisticated intelligence
apparatus and the ability of our Armed Forces to act and to
interdict. There are further considerations, however. Security
subsists, too, in fidelity to freedom’s first principles. Chief
among these are freedom from arbitrary and unlawful
restraint and the personal liberty that is secured by adherence
to the separation of powers. It is from these principles that the
judicial authority to consider petitions for habeas corpus relief
derives.188

Justice Scalia provided for a low point of judicial
temperament and independence when he engaged in a highly
inflammatory and disrespectful tirade against the majority:
America is at war with radical Islamists. The enemy began by
killing Americans and American allies abroad: 241 at the
Marine barracks in Lebanon, 19 at the Khobar Towers in
Dhahran, 224 at our embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi,
and 17 on the USS Cole in Yemen. On September 11, 2001, the
enemy brought the battle to American soil, killing 2,749 at the
Twin Towers in New York City, 184 at the Pentagon in
Washington, D.C., and 40 in Pennsylvania.
The game of bait-and-switch that today’s opinion plays
upon the Nation’s Commander in Chief will make the war

188.

Id. at 728–29.
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harder on us. It will almost certainly cause more Americans to
be killed. . . .
In the short term . . . the decision is devastating. At least
30 of those prisoners hitherto released from Guantanamo Bay
have returned to the battlefield. Some have been captured or
killed. But others have succeeded in carrying on their
atrocities against innocent civilians. . . .
These, mind you, were detainees whom the military had
concluded were not enemy combatants. Their return to the kill
illustrates the incredible difficulty of assessing who is and who
is not an enemy combatant in a foreign theater of operations
where the environment does not lend itself to rigorous
evidence collection.189

The lack of civility in Justice Scalia’s dissent has not been
much noted in either scholarly or journalistic commentary.
Accusing his colleagues of “caus[ing] more Americans to be killed”
is hardly the discourse of persuasion and judicial temperament.
Even more amazing is the lack of logic in the argument. If the
military has released dangerous people after deciding that they
are not enemy combatants, showing the difficulty of predicting
dangerousness, how does that argue against judicial review over
the power to imprison someone? What in that argument gives rise
to an inference of confidence in the ability of anyone to predict
future dangerousness?
Following Boumediene, the D.C. Circuit was obligated to
develop standards for review of the detentions at Guantanamo.
Here are summaries of some of the D.C. court opinions leading up
to the question of what criteria should be used for determining
whether someone is to be detained.
Hamlily v. Obama.190 The Obama Administration staked out
its position on Executive detention in a brief filed in March 2009
in this case. It based the detention authority squarely on the
AUMF without mentioning inherent Article II powers, and it has
continued to take that position since.191 It took the position that
189. Id. at 827–29 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
190. 616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009).
191. See id. at 67 (noting the Government itself states its proposed
framework is based on the AUMF); see also id. at 66 n.1 (noting the Government
has dropped its Article II arguments) (citing Respondents’ Memorandum
regarding the Government’s Detention Authority at 1, Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F.
Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 1:05cv02378)).
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detention authority extended to members and substantial
supporters of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces,192
differing from the Bush Administration only by adding the
qualifier of “substantial” support for one who cannot be
considered a “member” of an “associated force.” The subsequent
cases have attempted to discern what would constitute
“substantial support” in the case of someone who was not directly
involved with al Qaeda or the Taliban, but (apart from the
Uighurs) there has not been anyone brought before the courts
who had no connection with operations in Afghanistan.193
Al-Bihani v. Obama.194 Al-Bihani served as a cook in a loose
affiliation of Taliban and al Qaeda volunteers fighting against the
Northern Alliance.195 He was captured and handed over to the
U.S. forces and ultimately sent to Guantanamo.196 The big
question centered around “whom the President can lawfully
detain pursuant to statutes passed by Congress. . . . The Supreme
Court has provided scant guidance . . . , consciously leaving the
contours of the substantive and procedural law of detention open
for lower courts to shape in a common law fashion.”197 The D.C.
Circuit panel in al-Bihani articulated a standard of “an . . .
individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda
forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against
the United States or its coalition partners.”198

192. See id. at 70 (describing the Government’s arguments on who could be
detained) (citing Government’s Response to Petitioners’ Joint Memorandum
Relating to Detention Authority at 6, Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63
(D.D.C. 2009) (No. 1:05cv02378)).
193. See e.g., Al Adahi v. Obama, 698 F. Supp. 2d 48, 65 (D.D.C. 2010)
(holding that the Government met its burden of demonstrating a petitioner had
been a member of or substantially supported al Qaeda, a determination that is
made by deciding “whether the individual functions or participates within or
sunder the command of the organization” (quotation omitted)); Hatim v. Obama,
677 F. Supp. 2d 1, 1 (D.D.C. 2009) (deciding that the Government may not
justify indefinite detention solely by demonstrating someone provided
substantial or direct support to enemy armed forces).
194. 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
195. Id. at 869.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 879 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 522 n.1 (2004)).
198. Id. at 872 (quoting Al-Bihani v. Obama, 594 F. Supp. 2d 35, 38 (D.D.C.
2009)).

346

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 305 (2014)

The standard can be satisfied by either of two independent
components:
While we think the facts of this case show Al-Bihani was both
part of and substantially supported enemy forces, we realize
the picture may be less clear in other cases where facts may
indicate only support, only membership, or neither. We have
no occasion here to explore the outer bounds of what
constitutes sufficient support or indicia of membership to meet
the detention standard. We merely recognize that both prongs
are valid criteria that are independently sufficient to satisfy
the standard.199

Bensayah v. Obama.200 “Bensayah, an Algerian citizen, was
arrested by the Bosnian police on immigration charges in late
2001.”201 He and the five other Algerian men arrested in Bosnia
were suspected of plotting to attack the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo
but eventually were released for insufficient evidence.202 The six
were turned over to the United States and transported to
Guantanamo in early 2002.203
The district court granted habeas relief to the other five men
on the ground that there was no reliable evidence that they had
intended to travel to Afghanistan to fight against the United
States.204. The district court, however, denied Bensayah’s petition
for habeas corpus, holding that the Government had adduced
sufficient evidence to show it was more likely than not that he
had “supported” al Qaeda.205 The evidence for this conclusion
consisted primarily of a classified document plus corroboration
from a classified source.206 On appeal, the Government disclaimed
reliance on the source and abandoned the argument that he had
provided “support” for al Qaeda.207 Instead, it argued that he was

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id. at 873–74.
610 F.3d 718 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 720.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 721.
Id. at 722.
Id.
Id.
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“part of” al Qaeda.208 The D.C. Circuit panel started with this
observation:
Although it is clear al Qaeda has, or at least at one time had, a
particular organizational structure, the details of its structure
are generally unknown, but it is thought to be somewhat
amorphous. As a result, it is impossible to provide an
exhaustive list of criteria for determining whether an
individual is “part of” al Qaeda. That determination must be
made on a case-by-case basis by using a functional rather than
a formal approach and by focusing upon the actions of the
individual in relation to the organization. That an individual
operates within al Qaeda’s formal command structure is surely
sufficient but is not necessary to show he is “part of” the
organization; there may be other indicia that a particular
individual is sufficiently involved with the organization to be
deemed part of it, but the purely independent conduct of a
freelancer is not enough.209

The court stated that membership in al Qaeda would be
enough to justify detention, but the Government must produce
evidence showing participation in some activity directly
connected to an associated group.210 Without the asserted
corroboration for the classified document, the court of appeals
found there was insufficient evidence to show that he was “part
of” an organization and remanded for the district court to receive
any further evidence that the Government might choose to bring
forward.211 Much of the opinion is redacted so it is impossible to
know what he did or what the Government did to obtain evidence
about him.
Conclusion—Preliminary. The D.C. Circuit has decided that
the government is entitled to introduce hearsay testimony and
that testimony is even entitled to a presumption of regularity, not
exactly a presumption of truthfulness of the statement but that
the statement was made.212 The burden of proof to show
detainability remains on the government and the hearsay
evidence is introduced only for whatever probative value it may
208. Id. at 720.
209. Id. at 725 (citations omitted).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 727.
212. See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 879 (2012) (applying the Hamdi
rule that hearsay should be admitted as long as petitioner is allowed to rebut it).
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have, while the detainee is entitled to introduce evidence to rebut
the government’s position.213
As of mid-2010, the scorecard was 32–16 in favor of the
petitioners.214 Since that time, not a single habeas petition has
been granted.215 Probably, the easy cases were decided early and
the prisoners released so that the remaining Guantanamo
detainees mostly have demonstrable ties to al Qaeda or the
Taliban and thus meet the standards for detention.
The saga of U.S. involvement with Guantanamo detention is
long, complicated, and likely to continue for some time. The
purpose of this exercise has been merely to address the degree of
deference given by the judiciary to the Executive and Legislative
branches. It is a mixed story. Although the courts have talked in
deferential terms and allowed unusual procedures (such as use of
hearsay evidence), there has been no carte blanche acquiescence
to all detentions at Guantanamo or to the standards and
procedures adopted by Congress. That, unfortunately, is not true
with many of the cases to which we will turn next.
2. Looking Away from Domestic Executive Detentions
a. Aliens as a Special Class
Immediately after 9/11, resident aliens became the primary
focus of counterterrorism efforts. The majority of the detainees in
the PENTTBOM216 investigation were aliens who were placed in
the custody of immigration officials.217 Signed into law on October
213. See id. (discussing procedural and policy reasons for admitting hearsay
in military commissions).
214. See generally CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, GUANTANAMO HABEAS
SCORECARD
(2012),
http://ccrjustice.org/files/2012-0530%20Updated%20Habeas%20SCORECARD.pdf.
215. Id.
216. “PENTTBOM” refers to the FBI’s investigation of the 9/11 attacks. U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES:
A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN
CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 1 (2003)
[hereinafter OIG REPORT].
217. See id. at 3 (explaining that the report focuses on treatment of persons
detained by the Immigration and Naturalization Service at “two facilities
because they held the majority of September 11 detainees”).
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26, 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act218 contained a provision
authorizing the Attorney General to “take into custody” any alien
he has reasonable grounds to believe is involved in terrorist
activity and to hold the alien for up to six months in renewable
increments,219 with no process or evidentiary hearing and subject
only to judicial review by a habeas corpus petition.220 Apparently,
however, DOJ did not use this power because it had sufficient
authority under existing law to hold aliens considered for
deportation without bond.221
In 2002, DOJ announced the “National Security Entry–Exit
Registration System” (NSEERS).222 Among other things,
NSEERS instituted a “special call-in registration” program that
required alien males from designated countries (all Muslimmajority states except for North Korea) to report to immigration
offices to be fingerprinted, photographed, and interviewed.223
218. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
219. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)(6) (2012)
An alien detained [for suspicion of terrorist or espionage activity] and
whose removal is unlikely in the reasonably foreseeable future, may
be detained for additional periods of up to six months only if the
release of the alien will threaten the national security of the United
States or the safety of the community or any person.
220. See id. § 1226a(b) (“Judicial review of any action or decision relating to
this section . . . is available exclusively in habeas corpus proceedings . . . . Except
as provided in the preceding sentence, no court shall have jurisdiction to review,
by habeas corpus petition or otherwise, any such action or decision.”).
221. See The USA Patriot Act: Myth v. Reality, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/subs/add_myths.htm#s412 (last visited Feb. 3,
2014)
As of February 2004, the Attorney General had not used section 412.
Numerous aliens who could have been considered have been detained
since the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act. But it has not proven
necessary to use section 412 in these particular cases because
traditional administrative bond proceedings have been sufficient to
detain these individuals without bond. The Department believes that
this authority should be retained for use in appropriate situations.
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
222. Attorney General Ashcroft Announces Implementation of the First Phase
of the National Security Entry–Exit Registration System, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.
(Aug. 12, 2002), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2002/August/02_ag_466.htm (last
visited Feb. 3, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
223. See Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 433 (2d Cir. 2008) (describing the
NSEERS program).
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Those who did not report were threatened with arrest.224
According to multiple sources, the program registered nearly
83,000 aliens, more than 13,000 of whom were placed in
deportation proceedings.225 In a series of cases, the program was
challenged by aliens whose registration led to deportation
proceedings, and in each case, the arguments were rejected.226 In
Rajah v. Mukasey,227 for instance, the Second Circuit found no
Equal Protection violation:
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 were facilitated
by the lax enforcement of immigration laws. The [Special Call–
In Registration] Program was designed to monitor more
closely aliens from certain countries selected on the basis of
national security criteria. The individuals subject to special
registration under the Program were neither citizens nor even
lawful permanent residents. They were asked to provide
information regarding their immigration status and other
matters relevant to national security. They were not held in
custody for appreciable lengths of time. Those whose
immigration status was not valid were subject to generally
applicable legal proceedings to enforce pre-existing
immigration laws. In sum, the Program was a plainly rational
attempt to enhance national security.228
224. Id.
225. Nurth C. Aizenman & Edward Walsh, Immigrants Fear Deportation
After Registration; Number of Mideast, Muslim Men Expelled Rises Sharply,
WASH. POST, July 28, 2003, at A1.
226. See, e.g., Alnahham v. Holder, 371 F. App’x 191, 196 (2d Cir. 2010)
(holding plaintiff “Alnahham had no right to remain silent with respect to [the
Special Call-In Registration Program’s] requirement that he appear for
registration, fingerprinting and presentation of immigration-related documents”
(citation omitted)); Rajah, 544 F.3d at 434–36, 438–443 (finding the Special
Call-In Registration Program was authorized by statute and not
unconstitutional); Malik v. Gonzales, 213 F. App’x 173, 174 (4th Cir. 2007)
(stating that removal proceedings pursuant to NSEERS did not violate
plaintiff’s constitutional rights and federal courts did not have jurisdiction to
hear these kinds of claims); Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2006)
(same); Ahmed v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding immigration
judge did not violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights by denying continuance of
removal proceedings brought after plaintiff’s registration with NSEERS); Zafar
v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 461 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2006) (same); Shaybob v. U.S. Att’y
Gen., 189 F. App’x 127 (3d Cir. 2006) (same).
227. 544 F.3d 427 (2d Cir. 2008).
228. Id. at 438–39 (citations omitted). Although the NSEERS re-registration
requirement was suspended in December 2003, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FACT
SHEET: CHANGES TO NATIONAL SECURITY ENTRY/EXIT REGISTRATION SYSTEM
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With mounting complaints about post-9/11 investigations,
DOJ’s Office of Inspector General undertook a review of the
detentions and the conditions of confinement of terrorism
suspects.229 Released in June 2003, the report noted that agents
investigating leads would arrest all individuals who were out of
immigration status and treat them as being “of interest” in the
9/11 investigation, regardless of whether they were connected
with the lead.230 Moreover, leads resulting in arrests were often
very “general in nature, such as a landlord reporting suspicious
activity by an Arab tenant.”231
b. A “Plausible” Claim of Policy
In December 2003, a supplemental report found evidence of
verbal and physical abuse of 9/11 detainees at the Metropolitan
Detention Center (MDC) in New York City.232 Although it did not
find that detainees had been brutally beaten, “some officers
slammed detainees against the wall, twisted their arms and
hands in painful ways, stepped on their leg restraint chains, and
punished them by keeping them restrained for long periods of
time.”233 A number of lawsuits were filed by MDC detainees,
including one by Javad Iqbal, a Pakistani Muslim arrested on
criminal charges and detained in restrictive conditions as a

(NSEERS) 1 (2003), the NSEERS program itself continued until 2011. See DHS
Removes Designated Countries from NSEERS Registration (May 2011), U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/dhs-removes-designatedcountries-nseers-registration-may-2011 (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (noting that
the Department was “effectively ending the NSEERS registration process
through the publication of a notice in the Federal Register”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
229. OIG REPORT, supra note 216, at 2–3.
230. See id. at 16 (providing an example of how law enforcement officials in
New York followed such a process).
231. Id.
232. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN.,
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES’ ALLEGATION OF ABUSE AT
THE METROPOLITAN DETENTION CENTER IN BROOKLYN, NEW YORK 47 (2003) (“[W]e
believe that the evidence developed in our investigation shows physical and
verbal abuse of some detainees by some MDC staff members.”).
233. Id. at 46.
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person of “high interest” in the 9/11 investigation.234 After
pleading guilty, serving a term of imprisonment, and being
deported to Pakistan, Iqbal filed a Bivens235 action against federal
officials “rang[ing] from the correctional officers who had day-today contact with respondent during the term of his
confinement, . . . all the way to petitioners—officials who were at
the highest level of the federal law enforcement hierarchy.”236
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal,237 the Supreme Court concluded that the
complaint against Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI
Director Robert Mueller failed to plead sufficient facts to state a
claim for relief.238 The Court rejected out of hand the allegations
that Ashcroft and Mueller countenanced harsh treatment of
detainees based on their religion, race, and national origin,
holding that “[t]hese bare assertions . . . amount to nothing more
than a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements’ of a constitutional
discrimination claim.”239 It also found that Iqbal failed to make a
plausible showing that Ashcroft and Mueller purposefully
adopted a policy of invidious discrimination in classifying 9/11
detainees as being “high interest”:
The September 11 attacks were perpetrated by 19 Arab
Muslim hijackers who counted themselves members in good
standing of al Qaeda, an Islamic fundamentalist group. Al
Qaeda was headed by another Arab Muslim—Osama bin
Laden—and composed in large part of his Arab Muslim
disciples. It should come as no surprise that a legitimate policy
directing law enforcement to arrest and detain individuals
because of their suspected link to the attacks would produce a
disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even though
234. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 666–67 (2009) (“Iqbal is a citizen of
Pakistan and a Muslim. In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks he was arrested in the United States on criminal charges and detained
by federal officials. . . . [Iqbal] was designated a person ‘of high interest’ to the
September 11 investigation . . . .”).
235. Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971). Bivens recognizes a cause of action for monetary damages by an
individual whose constitutional rights have been violated by federal officials. Id.
at 391–97.
236. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 668 (citation omitted).
237. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
238. Id. at 687.
239. Id. at 681 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)).
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the purpose of the policy was to target neither Arabs nor
Muslims.240

To allow this suit to go forward, the Court concluded, would
divert the attention of those officials charged with responding to
“a national and international security emergency unprecedented
in the history of the American republic.”241 After Iqbal, the
Second Circuit partially reversed the dismissal of another suit by
MDC detainees, allowing them the opportunity to meet the
Supreme Court’s pleading standard with regard to claims related
to the conditions of confinement.242
c. Material Witness Warrants
Another basis for detaining persons is the material witness
warrant. Material witness warrants are issued by a judge or
magistrate under conditions similar to an arrest warrant, but
their purpose is to secure a person’s testimony rather than to
hold him for trial.243 Before issuing a warrant, a court will require
probable cause to believe that the person’s testimony is material
and that it may be impracticable to secure the person’s presence
by subpoena.244
In the post-9/11 atmosphere, material witness warrants were
used to secure a number of people who were thought to be
240. Id. at 682.
241. Id. at 685 (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 179 (2d Cir. 2007)
(Cabranes, J., concurring)).
242. See Turkmen v. Ashcroft, 589 F.3d 542, 546–47 (2d Cir. 2009) (deciding
to “vacate that portion of the district court’s order denying dismissal of the
conditions of confinement claims on the ground that an outdated pleading
standard was applied, and to remand the case for further proceedings consistent
with the standard articulated in Twombly and Iqbal”). Five of the detainees
subsequently reached a $1.26 million settlement with the Government. Five
New York Men Detained and Abused in Post-9/11 Immigration Sweeps Settle
Case for $1.26 Million, CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (Nov. 3, 2009),
http://ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/five-new-york-men-detained-andabused-post-9/11-immigration-sweeps-settle-ca (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
243. See 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2012) (“If it appears from an affidavit filed by a
party that the testimony of a person is material in a criminal proceeding, and if
it is shown that it may become impracticable to secure the presence of the
person by subpoena, a judicial officer may order the arrest of the person . . . .”).
244. Id.
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plotters but as to whom there was not probable cause for arrest.
Their alleged plotting was said to be the basis for thinking they
would have material evidence for a grand jury, but this sounded
like a subterfuge to many observers, who claimed the warrants
were being used in lieu of preventive custody, a practice clearly
prohibited by due process.
For example, alleged “dirty bomber” Jose Padilla was
arrested under a material witness warrant and held for a month
before he was transferred to military custody as an enemy
combatant.245 In 2004, Brandon Mayfield was arrested and held
for two weeks as a material witness based on incorrect evidence
connecting him to the Madrid train bombings.246 Subsequent to
his release, Mayfield received an apology from the FBI and a $2
million settlement from the U.S. government.247
Not surprisingly, the use of material witness warrants
suspected to be subterfuge for preventive custody was challenged
in several terrorism-related cases. In United States v.
Awadallah,248 Osama Awadallah was taken into custody in Los
Angeles after his name and phone number were found on a gum
wrapper in the car of one of the 9/11 hijackers.249 Awadallah was
detained on a material witness warrant and flown to New York,
where he testified twice before a grand jury over the course of
several days.250 He admitted having met two of the hijackers and
described their physical appearances.251 Initially, he claimed to
know the name of only one and not the other, but during his
second appearance he conceded he thought he knew the name of
the other hijacker.252 Charged with perjury, Awadallah moved to
245. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 390 (4th Cir. 2005); see also infra Part
IV.C.1 (discussing Padilla).
246. Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964, 966–67 (9th Cir. 2010); see
also infra notes 411–23 and accompanying text (discussing Mayfield).
247. Mayfield, 599 F.3d at 968.
248. 202 F. Supp. 2d 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev’d, 349 F.3d 42 (2d. Cir. 2003).
249. Id. at 58.
250. Id. at 58–59.
251. Id.
252. See id. at 59
Awadallah immediately denied writing the name “Khalid” in the
booklet. However, five days later, when he again testified before the
grand jury, Awadallah testified that he had written the word “Khalid”
When asked if he ‘recalled any part of this man’s name,’ Awadallah
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suppress his grand jury statement253 and dismiss the indictment
for abuse of the material witness statute.254 The district judge
agreed: “[S]ince 1789, no Congress has granted the government
the authority to imprison an innocent person in order to
guarantee that he will testify before a grand jury conducting a
criminal investigation.”255 The Second Circuit reversed, holding
that obtaining grand jury testimony would be an appropriate use
of the material witness statute:
The district court noted (and we agree) that it would be
improper for the government to use § 3144 for other ends, such
as the detention of persons suspected of criminal activity for
which probable cause has not yet been established. However,
the district court made no finding (and we see no evidence to
suggest) that the government arrested Awadallah for any
purpose other than to secure information material to a grand
jury investigation. Moreover, that grand jury was
investigating the September 11 terrorist attacks. The
particular governmental interests at stake therefore were the
indictment and successful prosecution of terrorists whose
attack, if committed by a sovereign, would have been
tantamount to war, and the discovery of the conspirators’
means, contacts, and operations in order to forestall future
attacks.256

Another case eventually made it to the Supreme Court.257 In
2005, Abdullah al-Kidd, an African-American Muslim, brought a
suit against Attorney General John Ashcroft and others, claiming
that he had been illegally arrested and confined under the federal

testified that he thought that the “man’s name was Khalid.”
253. Id.
254. Id. at 61.
255. Id. at 82 (citation omitted).
256. United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 59 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation
omitted); see also In re Grand Jury Material Witness Det., 271 F. Supp. 2d 1266,
1268–69 (D. Or. 2003) (finding that a grand jury proceeding is a “criminal
proceeding” as used in the material witness statute and thus a witness could be
detained under the statute for grand jury proceedings); In re Application of
United States for a Material Witness Warrant, 213 F. Supp. 2d 287, 289–300
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (declining to follow the district court’s approach in Awadallah
and ruling that grand jury proceedings are “criminal proceedings” for the
purposes of the material witness statute).
257. The Supreme Court denied Awadallah’s petition for certiorari.
Awadallah v. United States, 543 U.S. 1056, 1056 (2005).
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material witness statute.258 As summarized by the appellate
court,
[Al-Kidd] was arrested at a Dulles International Airport ticket
counter. He was handcuffed, taken to the airport’s police
substation, and interrogated. Over the next sixteen days, he
was confined in high security cells lit twenty-four hours a day
in Virginia, Oklahoma, and then Idaho, during which he was
strip searched on multiple occasions. Each time he was
transferred to a different facility, al-Kidd was handcuffed and
shackled about his wrists, legs, and waist. He was eventually
released from custody by court order, on the conditions that he
live with his wife and in-laws in Nevada, limit his travel to
Nevada and three other states, surrender his travel
documents, regularly report to a probation officer, and consent
to home visits throughout the period of supervision. By the
time al-Kidd’s confinement and supervision ended, fifteen
months after his arrest, al-Kidd had been fired from his job as
an employee of a government contractor because he was
denied a security clearance due to his arrest, and had
separated from his wife. He has been unable to obtain steady
employment since his arrest.259

According to al-Kidd, his mistreatment was the result of a
program devised by Ashcroft and other government officials, as
evidenced by a number of DOJ statements publicly extolling the
utility of the procedure.260
In Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd,261 a unanimous Supreme Court held
that the former Attorney General enjoyed qualified immunity
given the lack of clearly established law.262 Justice Scalia’s
majority opinion went further by holding that “an objectively
reasonable arrest and detention of a material witness pursuant to
a validly obtained warrant cannot be challenged as
unconstitutional on the basis of allegations that the arresting
258. Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 955–56 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S.
Ct. 2074 (2011).
259. Id. at 951–52.
260. See Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 598 F.3d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 2010) (Smith, J.,
concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (noting that various statements made
by DOJ officials supported the notion that “Ashcroft and others operating at his
direction, or in concert with him, had decided to undertake a novel use of . . . the
material witness statute”).
261. 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011).
262. Id. at 2085–86.
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authority had an improper motive.”263 Four concurring Justices
reiterated that the Court left unresolved questions it need not
reach to decide the case: whether the material witness warrant
was necessary to secure al-Kidd’s testimony and, more generally,
whether the material witness statute comports with the Fourth
Amendment’s Warrant Clause.264 Concurring Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg, and Sotomayor also objected to the majority’s apparent
disposition of the merits of al-Kidd’s claim:
In addressing al-Kidd’s Fourth Amendment claim against
Ashcroft, the Court assumes at the outset the existence of a
validly
obtained
material
witness
warrant.
That
characterization is puzzling. Is a warrant “validly obtained”
when the affidavit on which it is based fails to inform the
issuing Magistrate Judge that “the Government has no
intention of using [al-Kidd as a witness] at [another’s] trial,”
and does not disclose that al-Kidd had cooperated with FBI
agents each of the several times they had asked to interview
him?
Casting further doubt on the assumption that the
warrant was validly obtained, the Magistrate Judge was not
told that al-Kidd’s parents, wife, and children were all citizens
and residents of the United States. In addition, the affidavit
misrepresented that al-Kidd was about to take a one-way
flight to Saudi Arabia, with a first-class ticket costing
approximately $5,000; in fact, al-Kidd had a round-trip, coachclass ticket that cost $1,700. Given these omissions and
misrepresentations, there is strong cause to question the
Court’s opening assumption—a valid material-witness
warrant—and equally strong reason to conclude that a merits
determination was neither necessary nor proper.265

263. Id. at 2085.
264. See id. at 2085–86 (Kennedy, J., concurring, joined by Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Sotomayor, JJ.) (“Given the difficulty of these issues, the Court is
correct to address only the legal theory [of qualified immunity] put before it,
without further exploring when material witness arrests might be consistent
with statutory and constitutional requirements.”).
265. Id. at 2087–88 (Ginsburg, J., concurring, joined by Breyer and
Sotomayor, JJ.) (footnotes and citations omitted). Justice Ginsburg’s
concurrence also balked at the majority opinion’s statement that al-Kidd’s arrest
was “based on individualized suspicion”:
The word “suspicion,” however, ordinarily indicates that the person
suspected has engaged in wrongdoing. Material witness status does
not “involv[e] suspicion, or lack of suspicion,” of the individual so

358

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 305 (2014)
C. Domestic “Enemy Combatants”
1. The Odyssey of Jose Padilla

The Government aptly demonstrated its near-contempt for
judicial independence during the “rendition” of Jose Padilla for
trial when his lawyers filed a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court on his habeas corpus claim after he had spent
almost four years in solitary confinement without judicial
review.266
Padilla was arrested arriving at O’Hare Airport after flying
from Pakistan, where he allegedly trained in bombing
techniques.267 He was held initially as a material witness in New
York, then two days before his court-appointed counsel could file
identified.
This Court’s decisions, until today, have uniformly used the term
“individualized suspicion” to mean “individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing.”
The Court’s suggestion that the term “individualized suspicion” is
more commonly associated with “know[ing] something about [a]
crime” or “throwing . . . a surprise birthday party” than with criminal
suspects, is hardly credible. The import of the term in legal argot is
not genuinely debatable. When the evening news reports that a
murder “suspect” is on the loose, the viewer is meant to be on the
lookout for the perpetrator, not the witness. Ashcroft understood the
term as lawyers commonly do: He spoke of detaining material
witnesses as a means to “tak[e] suspected terrorists off the street.”
Id. at 2088 n.3 (citations omitted).
266. See Hanft v. Padilla, 546 U.S. 1084, 1084 (2006) (explaining that
Padilla wished to have the Court “consider his release [from military custody]
along with his petition for certiorari,” as opposed to the Government
transferring him while his petition was still pending). Chief Justice Roberts
granted the transfer and noted: “[t]he Court will consider the pending petition
for certiorari in due course.” Id.
267. See Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678, 679 (D.S.C. 2005), rev’d, 423
F.3d 386 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006) (“On May 8, 2002, Padilla
flew from Pakistan to Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport. As he stepped off
the plane, Padilla was apprehended by federal agents . . . .”); Donna Leinwand
& Jack Kelly, U.S. Citizen Arrested in ‘Dirty Bomb’ Plot, USA TODAY (June 11,
2002,
11:28
AM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2002/06/10/terror-arrest.htm (last
visited Feb. 3, 2014) (reporting that, prior to entering the United States, Padilla
had “traveled to Pakistan, where he studied how to assemble a radioactive
bomb,” according to a senior U.S. law enforcement official) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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for habeas corpus in New York, he was transferred to a Naval
Brig in South Carolina as an enemy combatant.268 The
Government’s public statements asserted that he was planning to
detonate a “dirty bomb” that would spread radioactive material
across a major city.269
His lawyers refiled his habeas petition in South Carolina and
the district court granted the petition, holding that the AUMF did
not grant authority to the President to hold a citizen arrested on
U.S. soil for a crime yet to be committed.270 The Fourth Circuit
then accepted the Government’s reframed assertions:
Padilla met with al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan, received
explosives training in an al Qaeda-affiliated camp, and served
as an armed guard at what he understood to be a Taliban
outpost. When United States military operations began in
Afghanistan, Padilla and other al Qaeda operatives moved
from safehouse to safehouse to evade bombing or capture.
Padilla was, on the facts with which we are presented, “armed
and present in a combat zone during armed conflict between al
Qaeda/Taliban forces and the armed forces of the United
States.”
. . . Once in Pakistan, Padilla met with Khalid Sheikh
Mohammad, a senior al Qaeda operations planner, who
directed Padilla to travel to the United States for the purpose
of blowing up apartment buildings, in continued prosecution of
al Qaeda’s war of terror against the United States. After
receiving further training, as well as cash, travel documents,
and communication devices, Padilla flew to the United States
in order to carry out his accepted assignment.271

268. See Padilla, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 681 (“On June 9, 2002, the [New York]
district court vacated the material witness warrant and petitioner was
transferred to military control. . . . On June 11, Padilla’s counsel, claiming to act
as his next friend, filed in the Southern District [of New York] a habeas corpus
petition . . . .”).
269. See Leinwand & Kelly, supra note 267 (“The dirty bomb plot was in its
initial stages and did not have a target, although [Padilla] has ‘indicated some
knowledge of the Washington, D.C., area,’ Deputy Defense Secretary Paul
Wolfowitz said Monday. Intelligence sources said Chicago also might have been
a potential target.”).
270. See Padilla, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 689–91 (rejecting the Government’s
position that either Padilla’s detention was explicitly authorized by Congress or
that the President possessed inherent power to order such a detention).
271. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 390 (4th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
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On this version of the facts, the court held that his carrying
of arms in Afghanistan made him an “enemy combatant”
appropriate for detention under the AUMF.272 The Fourth Circuit
held that Padilla was an “enemy belligerent” who “associated
with the military arm of the enemy, and with its aid, guidance,
and direction entered this country bent on committing hostile
acts on American soil.”273 But these “facts” were based on a
stipulation by the petitioner’s counsel for purposes of a summary
judgment motion—they were never subjected to a neutral
factfinder’s review274—and the claim that he entered the country
to explode a “dirty bomb” was dropped in favor of a variety of
modified contentions in different venues.275
The petition for certiorari was presented to the Supreme
Court on October 25, 2005.276 Just before its response to the
petition was due at the Supreme Court, the Government filed a
motion to transfer him to civilian custody in Florida to stand trial
on various charges.277 That motion was referred by the Fourth
Circuit to the Supreme Court, which granted it on January 4,
2006.278 The Court asserted that it would “consider the pending
petition for certiorari in due course,”279 which it did with a very
unusual set of opinions in April 2006. The petition was denied

272. Id. at 391.
273. Id. at 392 (citation omitted).
274. See id. at 390 n.1 (“For purposes of Padilla’s summary judgment
motion, the parties have stipulated to the facts as set forth by the government.
It is only on these facts that we consider whether the President has the
authority to detain Padilla.” (citation omitted)). Because the Fourth Circuit
granted the Government summary judgment on these facts, id. at 397, and the
Supreme Court subsequently denied Padilla’s petition for certiorari, Padilla v.
Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062, 1062 (2006), the Government was never required to prove
its facts at trial.
275. Infra notes 277–83 and accompanying text.
276. Brief of Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari, Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062
(2006) (No. 05-533).
277. See Padilla v. Hanft, 546 U.S. 1084 (2006) (“On November 22, 2005, the
Government filed a motion before the Fourth Circuit, seeking approval to
transfer Padilla from military custody to the custody of the warden of a federal
detention center in Florida, to face criminal charges contained in an indictment
filed November 17, 2005.” (citation omitted)).
278. Id.
279. Id.
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over three dissents with a concurring opinion by three Justices.280
Justice Kennedy, for the three concurring Justices, wrote:
In light of the previous changes in his custody status and the
fact that nearly four years have passed since he first was
detained, Padilla, it must be acknowledged, has a continuing
concern that his status might be altered again. That concern,
however, can be addressed if the necessity arises. . . .
That Padilla’s claims raise fundamental issues respecting
the separation of powers, including consideration of the role
and function of the courts, also counsels against addressing
those claims when the course of legal proceedings has made
them, at least for now, hypothetical. This is especially true
given that Padilla’s current custody is part of the relief he
sought, and that its lawfulness is uncontested.281

Ironically, it could just as easily be argued that the
“separation of powers, including consideration of the role and
function of the courts,” weighed heavily against allowing the
government to play fast and loose with the system by transferring
him once again to a different jurisdiction for a different purpose,
thus avoiding judicial review of his four-year-long detention.
Justice Ginsburg was quite restrained in her dissent from the
denial of certiorari, addressing merely the issue of whether the
petition was moot.282
All this came after Padilla’s application for habeas relief was
kicked from New York to South Carolina, granted by the district
court, and denied by the Fourth Circuit, by which time he had
been held in solitary confinement with no judicial review for
nearly four years. How can this be considered to be in compliance
with our own due process clause, let alone with any number of
international human rights provisions? It also illustrates the
near contempt with which the Administration tended to treat the
280. Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter voted to grant certiorari, but
only Justice Ginsburg wrote separately. Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062, 1062–
64 (2006). Justice Kennedy concurred in the denial of certiorari, writing on
behalf of himself, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Stevens. Id.
281. Id. at 1063–64 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari,
joined by Roberts, C.J., and Stevens, J.).
282. See id. at 1064 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari)
(noting that the Government’s “voluntary cessation [of reliance on purported
Executive authority] does not make [the] case less capable of repetition or less
evasive of review” (citation omitted)).
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Judiciary—deciding not to give the Supreme Court a chance at an
obvious violation of law.
Following these shenanigans, Padilla eventually was tried
and convicted on charges for conspiring to commit murder
outside the United States and conspiring to provide material
support to terrorism.283 He was sentenced to seventeen years in
prison284 and then brought a civil action for damages against
John Yoo,285 among others in California, while his mother
brought a similar action in Virginia.286 Both actions sought
damages for wrongful confinement as well as mistreatment while
in custody.287 These will be considered in the section below on
“Damage Actions Against Government Officials,”288 but suffice to
say at this point the courts have ducked those actions as well.
2. The Iliad of Ali al-Marri
Just as the Greek Iliad tells a very elaborate tale but
purports to cover only a few weeks in a protracted war, the case
of Ali al-Marri speaks volumes in the context of a single person’s
treatment at the hands of our government. Judge Motz’s opening
paragraph of her concurring opinion in the Fourth Circuit en
banc proceeding is worth quoting in full:

283. Peter Whoriskey, Jury Convicts Jose Padilla of Terror Charges, WASH.
POST (Aug. 17, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2007/08/16/AR2007081601009.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The charges were actually a touch
more complicated than that, and raise some substantial issues of the propriety
of conspiracy law, but that is a subject for another day. See United States v.
Hassoun, No. 04-60001-CR-COOKE/Brown, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85720, at
*10–13 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 20, 2007) (rejecting the various arguments of Padilla and
other defendants that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the
substantive law).
284. Peter Whoriskey & Dan Eggen, Judge Sentences Padilla to 17 Years,
Cites His Detention, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2008), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/22/AR2008012200565.html
(last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
285. Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 2012).
286. Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 546–47 (4th Cir. 2012).
287. Padilla, 678 F.3d 751–52; Lebron, 670 F.3d at 546.
288. Infra notes 364–73 and accompanying text.
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For over two centuries of growth and struggle, peace and war,
the Constitution has secured our freedom through the
guarantee that, in the United States, no one will be deprived
of liberty without due process of law. Yet more than five years
ago, military authorities seized Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, an
alien lawfully residing here. He has been held by the military
ever since—without criminal charge or process. He has been so
held, despite the fact that he was initially taken from his home
in Peoria, Illinois, by civilian authorities and imprisoned
awaiting trial for purported domestic crimes. He has been so
held, although the Government has never alleged that he is a
member of any nation’s military, has fought alongside any
nation’s armed forces, or has borne arms against the United
States anywhere in the world. And he has been so held,
without acknowledgment of the protection afforded by the
Constitution, solely because the Executive believes that his
indefinite military detention—or even the indefinite military
detention of a similarly situated American citizen—is
proper.289

Ali al-Marri, a citizen of Qatar, entered the United States on
September 10, 2001, to pursue a Master’s Degree.290 He was
arrested in December at his home in Peoria, Illinois, on suspicion
of handling money for al Qaeda.291 He was questioned about
credit card fraud and eventually charged with both forgery and
perjury.292 Almost two years after his initial arrest, on a Friday,
the court scheduled a hearing on pretrial motions.293 The
following Monday, he was certified by Presidential decree as an
enemy combatant and transferred to the Naval Brig in South
Carolina.294 To quote Judge Motz again:
Since that time (that is, for five years) the military has held
al-Marri as an enemy combatant, without charge and without
any indication when this confinement will end. For the first
sixteen months of his military confinement, the Government
did not permit al-Marri any communication with the outside
world, including his attorneys, his wife, and his children. He
289. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 217 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (per
curiam) (Motz, J., concurring, joined by Michael, King, and Gregory, JJ.),
vacated sub nom. Al-Marri v. Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 (2009).
290. Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 164 (4th Cir. 2007).
291. Id. at 165–66.
292. Id. at 164.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 164–65.
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alleges that he was denied basic necessities, interrogated
through measures creating extreme sensory deprivation, and
threatened with violence. A pending civil action challenges the
“inhuman, degrading,” and “abusive” conditions of his
confinement.295

The original panel of the Fourth Circuit, led by Judge Motz
over one dissent, held that he must be released or tried.296 Judge
Motz pointed out that the Government
does not assert that al-Marri: (1) is a citizen, or affiliate of the
armed forces, of any nation at war with the United States;
(2) was seized on or near a battlefield on which the armed
forces of the United States or its allies were engaged in
combat; (3) was ever in Afghanistan during the armed conflict
between the United States and the Taliban there; or
(4) directly participated in any hostilities against United
States or allied armed forces.297

Judge Motz was at pains to point out that the Government’s
allegations would justify trying al-Marri for very serious offenses,
but there was nothing to justify extrajudicial Executive detention
of someone who never directly participated in hostilities against
the United States.298
When the Fourth Circuit reheard this case en banc, the
result was a highly fractured set of opinions.299 Judge Wilkinson
believed the AUMF authorized al-Marri’s detention as an enemy
combatant on the basis of his alleged affiliation with the Taliban
or al Qaeda.300 The “low-water mark” for judicial independence in

295. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 220 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (per
curiam) (Motz, J., concurring, joined by Michael, King, and Gregory, JJ.),
vacated sub nom. Al-Marri v. Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 (2009).
296. See Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 164 (4th Cir. 2007) (stating the
Government could return al-Marri to civilian prosecutors and try him, but may
not subject him to military detention indefinitely).
297. Id. at 166 (emphasis added).
298. See id. at 164 (explaining that no Government allegation established alMarri as an enemy combatant even though al-Marri would face grave criminal
penalties if convicted in civilian criminal court).
299. See Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 216 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(per curiam), vacated sub nom. Al-Marri v. Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 (2009)
(listing seven separate opinions in addition to the per curiam opinion).
300. See id. at 294 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(declaring that the plurality ignores the plain language of the AUMF).
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this drama may be represented by these comments by Judge
Wilkinson:
The present case reminds that we live in an age where
thousands of human beings can be slaughtered by a single
action and where large swaths of urban landscape can be
leveled in an instant. If the past was a time of danger for this
country, it remains no more than prologue for the threats the
future holds. For courts to resist this political attempt to meet
these rising dangers risks making the judiciary the most
dangerous branch.
I say this not as an exhortation to panic or fear, but
rather as a call for prudence. The advance and
democratization of technology proceeds apace, and our legal
system must show some recognition of these changing
circumstances. In other words, law must reflect the actual
nature of modern warfare. By placing so much emphasis on
quaint and outmoded notions of enemy states and demarcated
foreign battlefields, the plurality (the opinion authored by
Judge Motz) and concurrence (the opinion authored by Judge
Traxler) misperceive the nature of our present danger, and, in
doing so, miss the opportunity presented by al-Marri's case to
develop a framework for dealing with new dangers in our
future.301

I suppose it is good the judge said this was not an
exhortation to panic or fear because otherwise I would have taken
it for exactly that. It is a call to abandon judicial processes for
unreviewable discretion of the Executive to imprison anybody at
any time anywhere simply because other people could be killed.
What is new in this? What are the “new dangers”? Slaughter of
innocents has always been with us, and unfortunately will
continue to be so. The pleas for Executive carte blanche power are
exactly what the writ of habeas corpus was developed to avoid, 302
and what many statements in various declarations of human
301. Id. at 293.
302. The infamous British Star Chamber was abandoned in 1641. See The
National Archives, Court of Star Chamber: 1485–1642, http://www.national
archives.gov.uk/records/research-guides/star-chamber.htm (last visited Feb. 3,
2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). It was a mixture of
“judges” and “privy councillors” that heard cases in secret and dealt mostly with
political crimes. Id. Although it started as a seemingly necessary way to deal
with accusations against powerful persons, it became a major source of
oppression by the monarchy.
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rights are all about. The way of unreviewed Executive discretion
is the way of tyranny.
The middle ground for the en banc court was struck by Judge
Traxler, who agreed that the AUMF provided authority for
detention of a domestic “enemy combatant” but read Hamdi as
requiring al-Marri be given an opportunity to rebut the claims
against him.303 This resulted in a divided court’s issuing an order
for remand for hearing at the district court on the
counterevidence.304
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.305 Again showing
contempt for the judicial process, the Government then applied to
the Court to transfer the prisoner to civilian authorities for trial
on the original charges, to which the Supreme Court
acquiesced.306 Al-Marri pleaded guilty to providing material
support under § 2339B307 and was sentenced to 100 months in
prison; the sentence initially would have been 180 months under
the statute, but the judge granted credit of 71 months for time
spent in custody and another 9 months “to reflect the very severe
conditions of part of his confinement at the Naval Brig.”308
D. Damage Actions—Immunity, State Secrets, “Special Factors”
The three most commonly deployed doctrines to prevent
recovery by those who have been wrongfully mistreated (allegedly
in some cases, certainly in others) have been the state secrets
privilege (SSP), qualified immunity, and the special factors
exception to federal damage actions.309 These three doctrines are

303. See Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 253–54 (Traxler, J., concurring in the
judgment) (agreeing with the opinion that the AUMF grants the President
detention powers over enemy combatants, but finding al-Marri did not receive
fair opportunity to rebut his “enemy combatant” status).
304. Id. at 216–17 (per curiam).
305. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 555 U.S. 1066 (2008).
306. Al-Marri v. Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 (2009).
307. 18 U.S.C. § 2399B (2012).
308. Al-Marri v. Davis, 714 F.3d 1183, 1186 (10th Cir. 2013).
309. See, e.g., George D. Brown, “Counter-Counter Terrorism Via Lawsuit”—
The Bivens Impasse, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 841, 877 (2009) (discussing these three
doctrines).
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somewhat intertwined and will be treated in a single section
devoted to damage actions.
Damage actions against federal officials begin under the
Bivens doctrine,310 under which federal courts will imply private
rights of action from some constitutional provisions, such as Due
Process for physical abuse, or the Fourth Amendment for
invasions of privacy.311
Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from
money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that
the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and
(2) that the right was “clearly established” at the time of the
challenged conduct.312

I mentioned above the case of Abdullah al-Kidd, who was
detained on a material witness warrant and then brought suit
against former Attorney General Ashcroft, alleging a post-9/11
policy of using the material-witness statute to detain individuals
with suspected ties to terrorist organizations.313 His complaint
alleged that agents detained suspects as material witnesses in
other cases as a pretext because they had insufficient evidence to
charge them with a crime.314 Al-Kidd, a native U.S. citizen, was
arrested in 2003 as he checked in for a flight to Saudi Arabia and
then held under a material-witness warrant issued by a federal
magistrate in an unrelated case.315 He was in custody for sixteen
days and on supervised release until the other trial concluded
over a year later.316
310. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971).
311. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 523–24 (1978) (applying
Bivens to commodity futures company’s claims, including personal privacy
violations); Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1054–55 (3d Cir. 1977) (making a
Bivens argument regarding alleged police abuse against two African-American
citizens).
312. Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011) (citing Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
313. See id. at 2079 (discussing the complaint’s assertion that the Attorney
General had no intention of calling these detainees as witnesses); see also supra
notes 259–65 and accompanying text (describing the al-Kidd case).
314. See Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2079 (stating that the Attorney
General directed the federal officials to detain suspected terrorist supporters
despite lacking enough evidence for a conviction).
315. Id.
316. Id.
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The Ninth Circuit held that Ashcroft “should have known”
that a pretextual use of a warrant was a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.317 For the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia responded
in his subtle fashion:
We have repeatedly told the lower courts—and the Ninth
Circuit in particular . . . not to define clearly established rights
at a high level of generality. . . . The Fourth Amendment was a
response to the English Crown’s use of general warrants,
which often allowed royal officials to search and seize
whatever and whomever they pleased while investigating
crimes or affronts to the Crown. . . . According to the Court of
Appeals, Ashcroft should have seen that a pretextual warrant
similarly ‘gut[s] the substantive protections of the Fourth
Amendmen[t] and allows the State to arrest upon the
executive’s mere suspicion.’ Ashcroft must be forgiven for
missing the parallel, which escapes us as well.318

In a similar case, Javad Iqbal unsuccessfully sued Attorney
General Ashcroft and FBI Director Mueller for policies that
resulted in his being mistreated while in custody awaiting
trial.319 He alleged that he was placed in a special administrative
unit and “subjected . . . to harsh conditions of confinement on
account of his race, religion, or national origin.”320 The Supreme
Court’s opinion by Justice Kennedy noted that Iqbal’s allegations
of mistreatment certainly stated violations of constitutional
rights by unknown guards.321 But nothing in his pleadings tended
317. Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 969 (9th Cir. 2009)
“There is a valid and important distinction between seizing a person
to determine whether she has committed a crime and seizing a person
to ask whether she has any information about an unknown person
who committed a crime a week earlier. . . .” That is precisely the
distinction at work here, and the reason we hold that Ashcroft’s policy
as alleged was unconstitutional.
(quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 428 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part)).
318. Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2084 (2011) (quoting Al-Kidd, 580
F.3d at 972).
319. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 668 (2009) (discussing plaintiff’s
claims of mistreatment in a maximum security prison). He eventually pleaded
guilty to charges of identity fraud, served his sentence, and was deported to his
native Pakistan. Id.
320. Id. at 666.
321. See id. (“Respondent’s account of his prison ordeal could, if proved,
demonstrate unconstitutional misconduct by some governmental actors.”).
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to validate his speculation that Ashcroft or Mueller had
authorized or prompted that treatment.322 Thus, applying the
Court’s recently adopted pleading standards requiring plaintiffs
to state a “plausible” theory of the facts,323 Iqbal failed to survive
a motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity.324
The state secrets doctrine has two aspects. One aspect
shields specific pieces of evidence when the privilege is claimed.325
The more extreme application occurs when the mere existence of
the litigation would be a threat to national security, resulting in a
total exception to the Bivens doctrine and dismissal of the
plaintiff’s case.326 The state secrets privilege protects a wide array
of governmental action in matters that touch upon national
security, and everything rides on the government’s ability to
persuade a judge of that without even producing any material for
in camera inspection:
It may be possible to satisfy the court, from all the
circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger
that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters
which, in the interest of national security, should not be
divulged. When this is the case, the occasion for the privilege
is appropriate, and the court should not jeopardize the security
which the privilege is meant to protect by insisting upon an
examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in
chambers.327

322. See id. at 682 (stating the complaint does not allege that Ashcroft or
Mueller adopted a policy of racial classifications).
323. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (requiring a
claim to be “plausible” rather than “conceivable”).
324. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 687 (“We hold that respondent’s complaint fails
to plead sufficient facts to state a claim for purposeful and unlawful
discrimination against petitioners.”).
325. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6–8 (1953) (describing
circumstances in which a court should exclude a certain piece of evidence based
on the state secrets doctrine).
326. See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1876) (stating that courts
must dismiss suits that would require disclosures involving the secret services
of the government); Wilson v. Libby, 498 F. Supp. 2d 74, 94 (D.D.C. 2007)
(finding “serious questions of justifiability” when secret national security
information is implicated).
327. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9–10 (explaining that a court should not
automatically require disclosure of the secret information in question to the
judge).
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Khaled El-Masri brought a damage action against George
Tenet, three corporate defendants, ten unnamed employees of the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and ten unnamed employees
of the defendant corporations.328 He alleged that he was originally
detained by Macedonian authorities, handed over to CIA
operatives who then transported him to Afghanistan, and finally
released somewhere in Albania.329 Along the way, he claimed to
have been “beaten, drugged, bound, and blindfolded during
transport; confined in a small, unsanitary cell; interrogated
several times; and consistently prevented from communicating
with anyone outside the detention facility.”330
The Fourth Circuit held that the claim inexorably involved
privileged state secrets and that the lawsuit could not proceed at
all.331 For the plaintiff even to make a prima facie showing of his
treatment, he would have to introduce evidence about CIA
operations.332
Such a showing could be made only with evidence that exposes
how the CIA organizes, staffs, and supervises its most
sensitive intelligence operations. . . . With respect to the
defendant corporations and their unnamed employees, ElMasri would have to demonstrate the existence and details of
CIA
espionage
contracts,
an
endeavor
practically
indistinguishable from that categorically barred by Totten and
Tenet v. Doe.333

Then if the plaintiff carried the prima facie burden, the
defendants would not be able to present a cogent defense without
disclosure of sources and methods.334
328. See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 300–01 (4th Cir. 2007)
(outlining the complaint).
329. Id. at 300–01.
330. Id. at 300.
331. See id. at 313 (recognizing the gravity of denying the plaintiff a judicial
forum for his complaint).
332. See id. at 309 (determining the plaintiff would have needed to produce
secret evidence linking the defendants with the alleged harm).
333. Id.; see also Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875)
(establishing an absolute bar to enforcement of confidential agreements to
conduct espionage, on the ground that “public policy forbids the maintenance of
any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead to the
disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as confidential”); Tenet v. Doe,
544 U.S. 1, 10–11 (2005) (reaffirming Totten in unanimous decision).
334. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 309 (4th Cir. 2007).
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The district court in El-Masri concluded its opinion
dismissing the complaint with these comments:
[N]othing in this ruling should be taken as a sign of judicial
approval or disapproval of rendition programs; it is not
intended to do either. In times of war, our country, chiefly
through the Executive Branch, must often take exceptional
steps to thwart the enemy. Of course, reasonable and patriotic
Americans are still free to disagree about the propriety and
efficacy of those exceptional steps. But what this decision
holds is that these steps are not proper grist for the judicial
mill where, as here, state secrets are at the center of the suit
and the privilege is validly invoked.
Finally, it is worth noting that, putting aside all the legal
issues, if El-Masri’s allegations are true or essentially true,
then all fair-minded people, including those who believe that
state secrets must be protected, that this lawsuit cannot
proceed, and that renditions are a necessary step to take in
this war, must also agree that El-Masri has suffered injuries
as a result of our country’s mistake and deserves a remedy.
Yet, it is also clear from the result reached here that the only
sources of that remedy must be the Executive Branch or the
Legislative Branch, not the Judicial Branch.335

In a case that generated significant controversy in the United
Kingdom, Binyam Mohamed was joined by four other detainees
who alleged they were tortured in various secret locations.336
They sued the operator of the aircraft (a Gulfstream V) that was
used by the CIA in “black site” and extraordinary rendition
operations.337 The Ninth Circuit echoed the sentiments of the
district judge in El-Masri with this comment:
This case requires us to address the difficult balance the state
secrets doctrine strikes between fundamental principles of our
liberty, including justice, transparency, accountability and
national security. Although as judges we strive to honor all of
these principles, there are times when exceptional
circumstances create an irreconcilable conflict between them.
On those rare occasions, we are bound to follow the Supreme
Court’s admonition that “even the most compelling necessity
335. El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 540–41 (E.D. Va. 2006).
336. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1073–74 (9th
Cir. 2010) (outlining plaintiffs’ factual allegations).
337. See id. at 1075 (describing plaintiff’s allegations that the defendant
provided flight planning and logistical support services).
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cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is
ultimately satisfied that [state] secrets are at stake.” After
much deliberation, we reluctantly conclude this is such a case,
and the plaintiffs’ action must be dismissed.338

Mohamed was repatriated to the United Kingdom and
created a major controversy with credible allegations of MI5
involvement in his interrogation and torture.339 The U.K. Court of
Appeal held that the British version of SSP would not shield
investigative reports that the court thought made it clear
Mohamed had been subjected to illegal treatment and raised
questions about the involvement of British officers.340 Mohamed
eventually settled his claims against the British Government for
£1,000,000.341
A Canadian citizen, Maher Arar, also brought suit in the
United States unsuccessfully342 and subsequently received a
significant settlement from his home government. Arar was
detained while in transit through JFK Airport on the basis of
information from Canadian authorities.343 His detention for
twelve days in New York, rendition to Syria, and ten months of
abuse in a Syrian prison were documented by a Canadian special
commission.344 His claims in Canada were settled by a $10.5
million payment and apology from the Canadian government.345
338. Id. at 1073 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345
U.S. 1, 11 (1953)).
339. See Al Rawi v. Security Service, [2010] EWCA (civ) 482 [5] (stating
plaintiff’s claims that MI5 contributed toward their “detention, rendition and ill
treatment”).
340. See id. at [11] (allowing trial to proceed with a closed material
procedure).
341. See Christian Gysin, Going Out Shopping, the Terror Suspect Who
Pocketed a Million in Compensation Over Torture Claims, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 31,
2011), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2055474/Binyam-Mohamed-Ter
ror-suspect-pocketed-1m-compensation-torture-claims.html (last visited Feb. 3,
2014) (discussing payout to former terror suspect who was allegedly tortured
with the complicity of British security services) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
342. See generally Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009).
343. COMM’N OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN
RELATION TO MAHER ARAR, REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR 27
(2006), http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-bcp/commissions/maher_arar/0709-13/www.ararcommission.ca/eng/AR_English.pdf.
344. Id. at 27–33.
345. See Ian Austen, Canada Reaches Settlement With Torture Victim, N.Y.
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In Arar’s suit against various U.S. officials, the Second
Circuit held that he could not state a claim under the Torture
Victims Protection Act346 because that statute deals only with
actions taken under color of foreign law and there was no
allegation that the U.S. officers were acting pursuant to Syrian
law.347 With regard to his detention for twelve days in New York,
he might have been able to state a due process claim but his
complaint did not “specify any culpable action taken by any single
defendant.”348 Judge Calabresi, joined by several colleagues,
dissented with this comment:
I respectfully dissent. . . . [B]ecause I believe that when the
history of this distinguished court is written, today's majority
decision will be viewed with dismay, I add a few words of my
own, “. . . more in sorrow than in anger.”349

In what it described as a “lamentable case,” complete with details
of the despicable treatment to which some detainees were
subjected in Abu Ghraib and Afghanistan, the D.C. District Court
reached a similar conclusion.350 In addition to the “crucial
national-security and foreign policy considerations” discussed by
the Second Circuit, the D.C. court engaged in a more extended
discussion of Eisentrager and its progeny because the plaintiffs in
these cases had never attempted to enter the United States and
indeed were detained in areas of active hostilities.351
The plaintiffs, as well as amici [retired military officers],
contest the notion that a Bivens remedy would impose judicial
oversight over military decision-making and chill military
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/26/world/americas/26cndcanada.html?_r=0 (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (describing the settlement and
three separate government apologies) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
346. Torture Victims Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat.
73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012)).
347. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 568 (2d Cir. 2009) (stating Arar did
not allege defendants possessed power under Syrian law).
348. Id. at 569.
349. Id. at 630 (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
HAMLET, act 1, sc. 2).
350. In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 88
(D.D.C. 2007).
351. See id. at 95–96 (discussing Eisentrager as “the most instructive” case
on point).
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effectiveness on the battlefield, arguing instead that
“providing an effective remedy for the violation of Plaintiffs’
constitutional rights would be wholly consonant with
longstanding military laws and regulations and would not
entangle the Court in any inappropriate inquiry.”. . .
The Court cautions against the myopic approach
advocated by the plaintiffs and amici, which essentially frames
the issue as whether torture is universally prohibited and
thereby warrants a judicially-created remedy under the
circumstances. There is no getting around the fact that
authorizing monetary damages remedies against military
officials engaged in an active war would invite enemies to use
our own federal courts to obstruct the Armed Forces’ ability to
act decisively and without hesitation in defense of our liberty
and national interests, a prospect the Supreme Court found
intolerable in Eisentrager.352

Shafiq Rasul (the titular petitioner in the 2004 Supreme
Court case out of Guantanamo353) was repatriated to the United
Kingdom in 2004.354 He and three others brought suit against a
variety of federal officials, including Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld,
for
tortious
mistreatment
and
religious
discrimination.355 Rasul and two others alleged that they were in
Afghanistan to provide humanitarian relief when they were
captured by the Northern Alliance and handed over to western
forces.356 Another co-plaintiff, al-Harith, alleged that he was
actually kidnapped out of Pakistan by the Taliban, from whom he
escaped before he was mistakenly detained by western forces.357
The D.C. Circuit held that
a. Their claims under the Alien Tort Statute358 should have
been brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act,359 which has
352. Id. at 104–05 (citations omitted).
353. See generally Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
354. See generally Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir. 2008), aff’d, 563
F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
355. Id. at 649–50.
356. See id. at 649–50 (describing the plaintiffs’ capture by a Uzbek warlord
and transfer into U.S. custody).
357. See id. at 650 (repeating al-Harith’s claims that U.S. and British forces
detained him after his escape from the Taliban).
358. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
359. Id. §§ 1346(b), 2674.
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a specialized procedure that must be followed when federal
officers are sued for acts done in the scope of employment;360
b. Their constitutional claims were unavailing because
nonresident aliens outside the United States have no
constitutional rights and because the claims would be barred
by the good faith immunity of the defendants;361
c. Their religious freedom claims were not cognizable under
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)362 because the
statute has no application to aliens located outside sovereign
United States territory at the time their alleged RFRA claim
arose.363

One more individual claimant for compensation is Jose
Padilla.364 As described above, Padilla was arrested at O’Hare
Airport and confined in isolation in a military brig for almost four
years until he was finally tried and convicted in a civilian federal
court trial.365 His civil suit then charged John Yoo with various
constitutional violations in rendering bogus legal opinions that
permitted
Padilla
to
be
subjected
to
extrajudicial
imprisonment.366
Yoo argued that “special factors” counseled against
implication of a Bivens claim.367 The court assessed the national
security implications of Yoo’s arguments by noting that Padilla
was not alleged to have taken up arms against the United States
or otherwise shown to have been “engaged in armed conflict” with
the United States, so the notion of making him a prisoner under
360. See Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2008), aff’d, 563 F.3d
527 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (noting that this procedure includes exhaustion of
administrative remedies).
361. See id. at 663 (stating that “Guantanamo detainees lack constitutional
rights because they are aliens without property of presence in the United
States”).
362. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–2000bb-4 (1994)
363. See Rasul, 512 F.3d at 671–72 (determining the plaintiffs did not
constitute “persons” under the RFRA).
364. See generally Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009),
rev’d, 678 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2012).
365. See id. at 1013–14 (describing the harsh conditions Padilla faced in the
Naval Brig); see also supra notes 267–71 and accompanying text (discussing
Padilla).
366. See id. at 1015–17 (describing the various memoranda the defendant, a
law professor, wrote about detention and interrogation).
367. Id. at 1022.
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the law of war was not a reason for denying him relief.368 Indeed,
unlike the allegations made by Iqbal against Attorney General
Ashcroft, “the Court finds Padilla has alleged sufficient facts to
satisfy the requirement that Yoo set in motion a series of events
that resulted in the deprivation of Padilla's constitutional
rights.”369 And with regard to Yoo’s claim for qualified immunity:
The Court finds that Padilla alleges a violation of his
constitutional rights which were clearly established at the
time of the conduct. Further, based on the fact that the
allegations involve conduct that would be unconstitutional if
directed at any detainee, a reasonable federal officer could
have believed the conduct was lawful. Therefore, Yoo is not
entitled to qualified immunity.370

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Yoo’s
derelictions were not so clearly established at the time as to have
stripped him of qualified immunity.371 The Ninth Circuit stated
the applicable standard to be whether “at the time he acted the
law was . . . ‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would
have understood that what he [wa]s doing violate[d]’ the
plaintiffs’ rights.”372 Meanwhile, the Fourth Circuit held that
Padilla, as represented by his mother in a separate action, could
not bring a Bivens claim against anyone for his allegedly
wrongful detention and mistreatment.373 The court reasoned,
similarly to its opinion in El-Masri, that any exploration into the
circumstances of his treatment would embroil the courts in
second-guessing the actions of the executive and legislature at a
time of national crisis.374 Those “special circumstances” thus
occasioned hesitation in implying a Bivens remedy.375
368. Id. at 1027.
369. Id. at 1034.
370. Id. at 1038 (citation omitted).
371. Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 768 (9th Cir. 2012).
372. Id. at 750 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011)).
373. See Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 560 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding
defendants were entitled to a qualified immunity).
374. See id. at 558 (discussing court practice of “preferring that Congress
explicitly authorize suits that implicate the command decisions of those charged
with our national defense”).
375. See id. at 556 (concluding that a variety of “sources of hesitation in
Padilla’s Bivens claim” require that the action not be maintained).
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Finally, there is one institutional plaintiff with a near-victory
in a compensation case but no compensation: the Al-Haramain
Foundation.376 In protracted litigation regarding the warrantless
and FISA-less surveillance program carried out by the NSA, the
plaintiff foundation first had to show standing to sue.377 The
foundation was able to persuade the Ninth Circuit that it had
probably been the target of unauthorized wiretaps because
otherwise there would have been no evidence on which the
Government could have based its petitions to have the
organization declared a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).378
After passing that hurdle, the plaintiff was then met with the
SSP, to which the trial court answered that FISA preempted SSP
by providing a civil remedy for unauthorized wiretaps.379 Allowing
the Government repeated opportunities to come forward with
evidence that surveillance of the foundation had in fact been
authorized by the FISA Court, the district court finally entered
summary judgment for the plaintiff and assessed damages and
attorney fees.380 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the grant
of summary judgment on the ground of sovereign immunity.381
E. “Special Needs” Exception—Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act
In December 2005, an article in the New York Times revealed
the existence of the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP), under
which “President Bush secretly authorized the National Security
Agency to eavesdrop on Americans and others inside the United
376. See generally Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Obama (In re NSA
Telecomm. Records Litig.), 700 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
377. See id. at 1194 (finding prior Ninth Circuit mandate did not preclude
plaintiffs from attempting to establish standing).
378. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1204 (9th
Cir. 2007) (“The organization posits that the very existence of the TSP, and AlHaramain’s status as a ‘Specially Designated Global Terrorist,’ suggest that the
government is in fact intercepting Al-Haramain’s communications.”).
379. See Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Obama, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 1197
(stating that the “FISA displaces the SSP in cases within its purview”).
380. See id. at 1204 (requesting from plaintiffs a proposed form of judgment
for damages, costs, and attorney’s fees).
381. Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. Obama, 690 F.3d 1089, 1099–
1100 (9th Cir. 2012), amended, 705 F.3d 845 (2012).
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States to search for evidence of terrorist activity without the
court-approved warrants ordinarily required for domestic
spying.”382 Apparently, the TSP was one of a collection of
clandestine intelligence activities referred to as the “President’s
Surveillance Program,” with the other parts of the program
remaining classified.383 As events have unfolded, we have been
exposed to reports of NSA projects called Carnivore and PRISM.
In May 2013, Edward Snowden became famous by going public
with reports of massive collection of phone and e-mail records of
American citizens.384 As if anyone was really surprised by these
disclosures, some politicians called him a traitor and the
government filed espionage charges against him.385
But even without regard to the unauthorized surveillance,
the very premise of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA) is highly debatable and has been subjected to minimal
judicial scrutiny. FISA386 was enacted in 1978 “to provide
legislative authorization and regulation for all electronic
surveillance conducted within the United States for foreign
intelligence purposes.”387 The whole premise for a secret special
court is something called the “special needs” doctrine. That
doctrine creates an exception to the Fourth Amendment, which
would otherwise require a judicial warrant before any electronic
surveillance (wiretap, e-mail intercepts, and the like) affecting
382. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without
Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/
16program.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/polit
ics/16program.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
383. See OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GEN. FOR THE DEP’T OF DEF., DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, NAT’L SEC. AGENCY & OFFICE OF DIR. OF
NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT’S SURVEILLANCE
PROGRAM (2009) (discussing what constituted the President’s Surveillance
Program). This report was mandated by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 301, 122 Stat. 2467 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C. (2012)).
384. See Peter Finn & Sari Horwitz, U.S. Charges Snowden With Espionage,
WASH. POST, June 21, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-0621/world/40116763_1_hong-kong-nsa-justice-department (describing Snowden’s
activities resulting in espionage charges).
385. See id. (discussing the charges against Snowden).
386. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92
Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C §§ 1801–1812 (2012)).
387. S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 9 (1978).
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U.S. persons.388 The Fourth Amendment protects the privacy of
“the people,” which could easily exclude foreign governments and
similar entities but might include foreign citizens lawfully within
the United States. Therefore, the “special needs” of intelligence
work would seem to apply, if at all, only to scrutinizing suspected
agents of foreign powers, which is how the statute at first was
constructed.
The most significant difference between a FISA court order
and an ordinary warrant is that a warrant requires a showing of
probable cause to believe that the target of the surveillance has
committed or is about to commit a crime, while the FISA order
originally could be based on probable cause to believe that the
target was an “agent of a foreign power,” which included foreign
political organizations.389 After 9/11, FISA was amended to allow
surveillance of any person believed to be outside the United
States (whose conversations, of course, could include U.S. citizens
at home).390
The premise of FISA was that a court-order scheme for
foreign intelligence electronic surveillance could be devised
consistent with the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of
reasonableness.391FISA created a special court of designated
federal judges—the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
(FISC)—that can issue orders authorizing electronic surveillance
388. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 521 U.S. 32, 54 (2000) (“The
‘special needs’ doctrine . . . is an exception to the general rule that a search must
be based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.”).
389. See 50 U.S.C § 1801(b) (2012) (defining “agent of a foreign power” with
distinctions between U.S. citizens and “any persons”).
390. See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(implementing “enhanced surveillance procedures” in order to “deter and punish
terrorist acts”) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
391. See S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 14–15
The departures here from conventional Fourth Amendment doctrine
have, therefore, been given close scrutiny to ensure that the
procedures established in [FISA] are reasonable in relation to
legitimate foreign counterintelligence requirements and the protected
rights of individuals. Their reasonableness depends, in part, upon an
assessment of the difficulties of investigating activities planned,
directed, and supported from abroad by foreign intelligence services
and foreign-based terrorist groups. Other factors include the
international responsibilities of the United States, . . . and the need to
maintain the secrecy of lawful counterintelligence sources and
methods.
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to gather foreign intelligence.392 A subsequent amendment
extended that authority to issuing court orders to conduct
physical searches for foreign intelligence purposes.393
Several courts struggled with whether “foreign intelligence”
had to be the “primary purpose” of the surveillance.394 The First
Circuit stated “the investigation of criminal activity cannot be the
primary purpose of the surveillance.”395 The Ninth Circuit refused
to distinguish between “purpose or primary purpose . . . . We
refuse to draw too fine a distinction between criminal and
intelligence investigations.”396
These discussions about the “purpose” requirement prompted
the FISA Court of Review, prior to 9/11, to approve the DOJ’s
practice of erecting a “wall” between criminal investigations and
intelligence investigations.397 The idea was that the looser
procedures of FISA should not be used for ordinary criminal
proceedings.398 The attacks of 9/11 prompted much hand-wringing
over perceived failures of the “intelligence community.” But there
is no way of knowing how many hundreds or thousands of other
leads similar to those of 9/11 could be followed to dead ends. Just
because there was one needle in the haystack does not mean that
one should have been found or that there were others to find.
Nevertheless, the USA PATRIOT Act—the “Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
392. See 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (1978) (allowing the appointment of judges to the
new court).
393. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103359, §§ 301–309, 108 Stat. 3423 (1995) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1821–1824
(1994)).
394. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 571–73 (1st Cir. 1991)
(analyzing FISA in the case of an American citizen researching and developing
explosives for the Provisional Irish Republican Army); United States v.
Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 964–65 (9th Cir. 1988) (analyzing FISA in the case of
Armenian terrorists).
395. Johnson, 952 F.2d at 572.
396. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d at 965.
397. See William C. Banks, And the Wall Came Tumbling Down: Secret
Surveillance After the Terror, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1147, 1148–49 (2003)
(discussing the origins of the “wall”).
398. See id. (noting that using FISA for espionage was acceptable, as “the
danger of espionage or international terrorism is grave, and that the privacy
intrusions are limited to the collection of information for foreign intelligence
purposes”).
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to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act”399—was enacted six
weeks after 9/11. It has served in some minds as a lightning rod
for debate, but could also be seen as a smokescreen for many
government policies that have nothing to do with the legislation
itself (for example, military detentions, harsh interrogation, and
extraordinary rendition).
For our purposes here, the principal impact of PATRIOT was
to modify FISA to require that gathering foreign intelligence
information is “a significant purpose” (rather than “the purpose”)
of surveillance.400
Following the amendment of FISA to require that foreign
intelligence be only a significant purpose, rather than the
primary purpose, of the surveillance,401 the Attorney General
issued a memorandum in March 2002 allowing full exchange of
information between law enforcement and intelligence units, and
permitting criminal prosecutors to consult with and advise
intelligence officials regarding FISA surveillance and searches.402
These changes were permissible because the PATRIOT Act
“allows FISA to be used primarily for a law enforcement purpose,
as long as a significant foreign intelligence purpose remains.”403
So interpreted, the Act essentially tears down the wall between
foreign intelligence and criminal investigation.
In a unanimous opinion, the FISA Court balked at the idea
that criminal investigation could be the primary purpose of
surveillance under FISA and rejected the new procedures.404 In
399. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
400. See id. § 218 (stating that certain sections of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act are amended by striking “the purpose” and inserting “a
significant purpose”) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804 (a)(6)(B), 1823(a)(6)(B)
(2012)).
401. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804 (a)(6)(B), 1823 (a)(6)(B) (2012) (describing how a
significant purpose is required for surveillance).
402. John Ashcroft, U.S. Att’y Gen., Intelligence Sharing Procedures for
Foreign Intelligence and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations Conducted
(Mar.
6,
2002),
by
the
FBI,
FAS.ORG
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/ag030602.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2014)
(“The Act also expressly authorizes intelligence officers who are using FISA to
‘consult’ with federal law enforcement officers . . . .”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
403. Id.
404. See In re All Matters Submitted to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
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the opinion of the FISC, separation of intelligence gathering from
law enforcement is necessary under the Fourth Amendment.405
In the first-ever appeal from the FISC, the Court of Review
(FISCR) in its In re Sealed Case406 decision reversed the lower
court’s retention of the wall of separation.407 FISCR described the
wall as a “false dichotomy” between intelligence gathering and
criminal investigation.408 In its view, foreign intelligence
information includes evidence of espionage, sabotage, terrorism,
and other crimes; likewise, a U.S. person who is an agent of a
foreign power is necessarily involved in criminal conduct.409
“Indeed, it is virtually impossible to read the 1978 FISA to
exclude from its purpose the prosecution of foreign intelligence
crimes.”410
Several years later, a district court judge in Oregon
disagreed with the FISCR and declared the amended FISA
scheme to be an unconstitutional violation of the Fourth
Amendment.411 The facts of the case were quite compelling:
Following the Madrid subway bombing of March 11, 2004,
Spanish authorities submitted to the FBI a fingerprint from a
plastic bag found in the subway.412 The fingerprint was identified
as belonging to Brandon Mayfield, an Oregon lawyer, former U.S.
Army officer, and practicing Muslim.413 As a result of the
Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 622–23 (FISA Ct. 2002) (discussing how the FISA
Court rejected new procedures), abrogated by In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717
(FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
405. Id. at 622–23.
406. 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
407. Id. at 746.
408. Id. at 725 (citing United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908
(4th Cir. 1980)).
409. See id. (upholding the government’s argument that foreign intelligence
information includes “evidence of crimes such as espionage, sabotage, or
terrorism”).
410. Id. at 723.
411. See Mayfield v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d. 1023, 1042 (D. Or.
2007) (“After the Patriot Act, however, FISA surveillance, including the
surveillance at bar, may have as its ‘programmatic purpose’ the generation of
evidence for law enforcement purposes—which is forbidden without criminal
probable cause and a warrant.”), overruled by Mayfield v. United States, 599
F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010).
412. Id. at 1027.
413. Id.
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fingerprint identification, the FBI applied for and received a
FISA order to wiretap Mayfield’s phones, to place listening
devices in his home, and to conduct sneak-and-peak searches of
his home and office.414 Mayfield was then arrested and detained
for more than two weeks.415 Finally, he was released after
Spanish authorities notified the FBI that they had matched the
fingerprint to an Algerian in their custody.416 In 2006, Mayfield
received an official apology and a $2 million settlement,417 which
still allowed him to pursue his constitutional challenge to
FISA.418
In ruling on this claim, the district court described how “a
seemingly minor change in wording”—from the purpose to a
significant purpose—has a profound effect on government powers
under FISA:
Now, for the first time in our Nation’s history, the government
can conduct surveillance to gather evidence for use in a
criminal case without a traditional warrant, as long as it
presents a non-reviewable assertion that it also has a
significant interest in the targeted person for foreign
intelligence purposes. Since the adoption of the Bill of Rights
414. Id. at 1028.
415. Id. at 1029.
416. See id. (“[O]n May 20, 2004, news reports revealed, that Spain had
matched the Madrid fingerprint with an Algerian, Ouhane Daoud. Mayfield was
released from prison the following day.”). The incident stands as a watershed for
fingerprint evidence, which was once considered infallible, but is now recognized
as fraught with potential for error. See, e.g., COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS
OF THE FORENSIC SCIS. CMTY., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED
STATES: A PATH FORWARD 1–3 (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
nij/grants/228091.pdf; Jennifer Mnookin, The Achilles’ Heel of Fingerprints,
WASH. POST, May 19, 2004, at A27 (stating that “the science of fingerprinting is
surprisingly underdeveloped” and that “[w]e lack good evidence about how often
examiners make mistakes, nor is there a consensus about how to determine
what counts as a match”).
417. See Dan Eggen, U.S. Settles Suit Filed by Ore. Lawyer; $2 Million Will
Be Paid for Wrongful Arrest After Madrid Attack, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2006, at
A3 (discussing how Mayfield and his family received $2 million dollars).
418. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that Mayfield lacked standing to
bring a Fourth Amendment challenge to FISA. See Mayfield v. United States,
599 F. 3d 964, 966 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding Mayfield lacked standing to pursue
his Fourth Amendment claim because his injuries were already substantially
redressed by the settlement agreement); infra notes 423–24 and accompanying
text (stating that a declaratory judgment would not impact Mayfield or his
family).
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in 1791, the government has been prohibited from gathering
evidence for use in a prosecution against an American citizen
in a courtroom unless the government could prove the
existence of probable cause that a crime has been committed.
The hard won legislative compromise previously embodied in
FISA reduced the probable cause requirement only for
national security intelligence gathering. The Patriot Act
effectively eliminates that compromise by allowing the
Executive Branch to bypass the Fourth Amendment in
gathering evidence for a criminal prosecution.419

The district court found the FISCR’s application of the
special needs doctrine to be “without merit.”420 After the
PATRIOT Act amendments, a FISA order need not meet a special
need beyond ordinary law enforcement.421 Instead, an order could
serve the same objective as a search warrant, having “as its
‘programmatic purpose’ the generation of evidence for law
enforcement purposes—which is forbidden without criminal
probable cause and a warrant.”422
The Ninth Circuit reversed on the ground that Mayfield
lacked standing because he had settled the damages claim “and a
declaratory judgment would not likely impact him or his
family.”423 And although at least one judge said he “shares the
very significant concerns that the ‘significant purpose’ standard
violates the Fourth Amendment,”424 the Mayfield opinion has
been termed an “outlier.”425 Thus, with the exception of a lone
judge in Oregon, courts have universally accepted the argument
419. Mayfield v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d. 1023, 1036–37 (D. Or.
2007), overruled by Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010).
420. See id. at 1041 (“The FISCR also attempts, without merit, to
distinguish the Supreme Court's ‘special needs’ cases.”).
421. See id. (discussing how the PATRIOT Act allows FISA to not require
the special needs carved out by the Supreme Court to violate the Fourth
Amendment).
422. Id. at 1042.
423. Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964, 966 (9th Cir. 2010).
424. United States v. Warsame, 547 F. Supp. 2d 982, 996 (D. Minn. 2008).
The Warsame court did not decide the issue, however, as it found that the
primary purpose of the FISA surveillance at issue was to gather foreign
intelligence. Id. at 994.
425. See United States v. Kashmiri, No. 09 CR 830-4, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
119470, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2010) (“The Court is not persuaded by the one
outlier district court case [Mayfield] which held that FISA, as it currently exists,
violates the Fourth Amendment.”).
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that FISA is not subject to the standards applicable to judicial
search warrants.426 The common rubric is that foreign
intelligence is different and gives rise to “special needs” of
government surveillance. It is difficult, however, to see what is
“special” about surveilling alleged plotters of violence. Perhaps
special needs could apply in the case of foreign governments or
political entities, which are not part of “the people” protected by
the Fourth Amendment anyway. The only persons who come
within the concerns of FISA are really foreign citizens in the
United States whom the government has probable cause to
believe are acting as agents of a foreign power. Thus, the whole
premise of FISA as a special needs exception to the Fourth
Amendment could be flawed even before the change to “a
significant purpose,” and is surely flawed, as the Oregon court
believed, when the relaxed standards have the “primary purpose”
of law enforcement.
The “special needs” cases to which the courts have referred in
creating this exception have all been instances in which the
target of the search had undertaken some voluntary departure
from the private realm—such as traveling by air, driving on a
public street, or operating a restaurant—in which the public
safety demanded an inspection without regard to probable
cause.427 It is possible that taking to the airwaves through
telephone or internet is a similar departure from normal life such
that we have relinquished any claim to privacy. But this
conclusion should at least deal carefully with all the Supreme
Court precedents regarding expectations of privacy, the issue
covered in the next section.428
426. The Mayfield opinion has been termed an “outlier.” United States v.
Kashmiri, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119470, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2010). Every
other federal court has upheld FISA as amended by the PATRIOT Act, often
relying on the reasoning of In re Sealed Case. See, e.g., United States v. AbuJihaad, 630 F.3d 102, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (collecting cases).
427. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (discussing the
search of a probationer’s home); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699–703
(1987) (analyzing the search of premises of certain highly regulated businesses);
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 721–25 (1987) (evaluating the work-related
searches of employees’ desks and offices); New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U.S. 325,
337–342 (1985) (describing the search of student’s property by school officials);
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558–60 (1979) (analyzing the intricacies of body
cavity searches of prison inmates).
428. The Court held in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967), that
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Just dealing with the basic justification of FISA, with the
lone exception of a district judge in Oregon, we have the apparent
specter of the Judiciary yielding to executive claims of special
needs arising from the threat of violence, resulting in a failure of
judicial review and loss of judicial independence. But, in 2013
came the “revelation” that the FISA Court had authorized
unlimited recording of data communications by U.S. citizens
within the United States—a revelation of little surprise to those
who were following the issue.
F. Carte Blanche for Electronic Snooping
The battle over NSA surveillance probably has less to do with
actual invasions of privacy and more to do with the sense that
government decided it can do whatever it wants to do with total
impunity. The existence of secret NSA programs is not at all
surprising to those who have paid close attention to this issue for
the last decade. The fact is that our government was never open
or transparent about what it was doing, and we knew it was not.
For example, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales in a number
of public statements during 2005 and 2006 was always careful to
say “the program the President has disclosed” is legal, leaving
open the inference that there was much more that had not been
disclosed:
A word of caution here. This remains a highly classified
program. . . . So my remarks today speak only to those
activities confirmed publicly by the President, and not to other
purported activities described in press reports. These press
accounts are in almost every case, in one way or another,
misinformed, confusing, or wrong. And unfortunately, they
have caused concern over the potential breadth of what the
President has actually authorized.429

Nowhere in the many public statements of the era—all of
which are contained on the DOJ website—is there any mention of
we have an expectation of privacy in telephonic communications. The NSA
surveillance program is built on later precedent regarding the bare data of
phone numbers and e-mail addresses.
429. E-mail from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, to U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs 2 (Jan. 24, 2006, 10:30 AM EST),
http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/surveillance15.pdf.
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the undisclosed activities of the NSA. Naturally we would get
“press accounts . . . [that were] misinformed, confusing, or
wrong.”430 But we probably got some information that was
accurate.
What do we know now in 2014? We know that NSA and its
affiliated agencies are capable of reading all our e-mail and
listening to our phone conversations.431 Do they do so? They
would have us believe they are too busy to bother with us little
people. But it is also clear that if the “metadata mining” reveals a
pattern of curiosity, then it is a simple matter to reach into the
grab bag and pull out everything any particular individual has
said for a long period of time.432 Indeed, some instances of
unauthorized snooping into content have been acknowledged and
one FISA judge has described the NSA as having repeatedly
misrepresented its activities to the court.433
The FISA Court has approved “programmatic” surveillance
by interpreting the word “relevant”434 to mean basically all
electronic communications, which can be monitored for suspicious
patterns.435 “And under the ‘reasonable suspicion’ standard, there
430. Id.
431. See James Risen & Laura Poitras, N.S.A. Gathers Data on Social
Connections
of
U.S.
Citizens,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
28,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/us/nsa-examines-social-networks-of-uscitizens.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (discussing how
the NSA is able to collect both email and phone data) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
432. See id. (“A series of agency PowerPoint presentations and memos
describe how the N.S.A. has been able to develop software and other tools—one
document cited a new generation of programs that ‘revolutionize’ data collection
and analysis—to unlock as many secrets about individuals as possible.”).
433. In re Production of Tangible Things from [Redacted], BR 08-13, at 5–6
(FISA Ct. March 2, 2009), http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/
pub_March%202%202009%20Order%20from%20FISC.pdf
(describing
the
government’s “non-compliance with the Court’s orders”).
434. 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2) (2012) (information likely to be obtained . . . is
relevant to an ongoing investigation to protect against international terrorism
or clandestine intelligence activities).
435. In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order
Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [Redacted], BR 13-109, at 18–
23 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br1309-primary-order.pdf; see also Wayne McCormack, Privacy, the NSA, and
Impunity, UTAH LAW TODAY (July 15, 2013), http://today.law.utah.edu/
projects/blog-privacy-the-nsa-and-impunity/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2014)
[hereinafter McCormack, Privacy] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
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is no judicial review when someone decides to look into the
content of those communications.”436
Frankly, I’m not so sure that privacy of information is really
that important, except to the extent that I need to be able to
protect my bank accounts from being raided. What makes the
NSA dustup more disturbing is the feeling within government
that government can act with impunity in the name of “national
security.”437
If they can read my e-mails today, can they haul me off to a
military brig without judicial approval tomorrow? Oh, wait, they
did that already—kept several people locked up for years with
total impunity—even tortured with impunity.438
Recently, two judges have taken a hard look at the NSA
activity and disagreed on the merits.439 At least, these two judges
did not yield to the temptation to abdicate judicial independence
in the face of the dreaded word “terrorism.”440
G. Standing
The U.S. federal courts have a rather mystical, ethereal
approach to their “special place” in separation of powers. Part of
the mystique is a doctrine called “standing,” which I have
described elsewhere as part of the “Mythology of Justiciability.”441
The heart of the doctrine is that a person who is not able to show
an injury by another person has no claim of right against that
Review).
436. McCormack, Privacy, supra, note 435.
437. See NSA/CSS Strategy, NAT’L SEC. AGENCY (Jan. 15, 2009),
http://www.nsa.gov/about/strategic_plan/(last updated Mar. 31 2011) (describing
the goals and strategies employed by the NSA to protect national security) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
438. See supra notes 5–24 and accompanying text (discussing various cases
in which people were imprisoned and tortured with total impunity).
439. Klayman v. Obama, Civil Action No. 13–0881(RJL), 2013 WL 6598728,
at (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2013) (determining the bulk collection of metadata to be
invalid); ACLU v. Clapper, No. 13 Civ. 3994(WHP), 2013 WL 6819708, at *24
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2013) (upholding practice).
440. Cf. Andrew E. Taslitz, Terrorism and the Citizenry’s Safety, CRIM. JUST.
4, 5–6 (2002) (discussing how terrorism has, in certain circumstances, led to
judicial abdication).
441. See generally McCormack, The Justiciability Myth, supra note 72.
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other person. The mystery is why we need to waste barrels of ink
and jurisprudential energy on a point basic to all of law—if you
haven’t harmed me, I don’t have a claim against you.442
Be that as it may, there are two instances in which federal
courts have turned blind eyes to what would seem to be palpable
injuries, either likely or threatened. These are the cases dealing
with the illegal surveillance by the NSA under the heading of the
Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP),443 and the targeted killing
of a U.S. citizen, Anwar al-Aulaqi.444
1. Have I Been Bugged?
A number of lawsuits challenged the NSA program. One suit
was brought by the ACLU on behalf of a group of individuals and
groups who regularly conducted international telephone and
Internet communications for legitimate professional reasons (for
example, journalism or the practice of law).445 A district court in
Michigan granted the plaintiffs’ request for an injunction, finding
that the TSP violated FISA, the First and Fourth Amendments,
and the separation of powers doctrine.446 On appeal, the Sixth
Circuit found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the
action.447 They could not show that any particular conversation
was intercepted, nor could the plaintiffs claim that any personal
interest was harmed by refraining from conversations that might

442. See id. (discussing the doctrine of standing and its various nuances).
443. Cf. Ellen Nakashima, AT&T Plaintiffs Cite McConnell Remarks, WASH.
POST, Sept. 1, 2007, (last visited Jan. 1, 2014) (“The Bush administration has
asked Congress to grant the phone companies immunity from lawsuits arising
from the [TSP].”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
444. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 1–14 (D.D.C. 2010)
(describing the litigation and the actual killing of Anwar al-Aulaqi).
445. ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 757 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (discussing
how persons who allegedly conducted regular international telephone and
internet communications brought action challenging NSA’s secret program).
446. See id. at 782 (“The Permanent Injunction of the TSP requested by
Plaintiffs is granted inasmuch as each of the factors required to be met to
sustain such an injunction have undisputedly been met.”).
447. ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 652 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[I]t follows that if the
plaintiffs lack standing to litigate their declaratory judgment claim, they must
also lack standing to pursue an injunction.”).
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be monitored.448 Judge Gilman dissented on the ground that the
attorney-plaintiffs had a clear duty to refrain from
communicating with clients when those communications were
likely to be intercepted, and were thus able to show a cognizable
harm from the threat of interception.449 Speaking to the merits,
Judge Gilman argued that the TSP was illegal because “the clear
wording of FISA and Title III that these statutes provide the
‘exclusive means’ for the government to engage in electronic
surveillance within the United States for foreign intelligence.”450
At the same time, the Al-Haramain Foundation and two of
its lawyers filed a similar action against the government in
Oregon district court.451 Al-Haramain is a Muslim charity
designated a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” by the
Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, which
freezes the organization’s assets and makes it illegal for others to
do business with it.452 At one point, the Government
inadvertently disclosed a “top secret” document that proved AlHaramain had been subjected to warrantless surveillance and
prompted a further claim for unlawful surveillance.453 The
Government sought to dismiss the case by invoking the state
secrets privilege, which the district court rejected on the basis
that the existence of the TSP was not a secret, and that “no harm
448. See id. at 656–57
By refraining from communications (i.e., the potentially harmful
conduct), the plaintiffs have negated any possibility that the NSA will
ever actually intercept their communications and thereby avoided the
anticipated harm—this is typical of declaratory judgment and
perfectly permissible. . . . But, by proposing only injuries that result
from this refusal to engage in communications (e.g., the inability to
conduct their professions without added burden and expense), they
attempt to supplant an insufficient, speculative injury with an injury
that appears sufficiently imminent and concrete, but is only
incidental to the alleged wrong . . . .
449. See id. at 695 (Gilman, J., dissenting) (arguing that the attorneyplaintiffs were able to show harm and distinguishing the facts of this case from
precedent on which the majority opinion relies).
450. Id. at 720; see also supra note 448 (detailing the majority’s argument).
451. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Or.
2006).
452. Id. at 1218.
453. See id. at 1219 (describing the inadvertent disclosure and the sensitive
information the document contained).
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to the national security would occur if plaintiffs [were] able to
prove the general point that they were subject to surveillance as
revealed in the Sealed Document,” so long as no other
information in the document was revealed.454
The Ninth Circuit granted the Government’s request for
interlocutory review of the state secrets issue,455 holding that the
public disclosures about the TSP had already made the basic
dimensions of the program known and thus the state secrets
privilege did not foreclose the lawsuit entirely.456 Nevertheless,
the top-secret document was protected by the privilege, and the
plaintiffs would not be allowed to introduce their memory of the
document into evidence.457 Although the court believed that the
plaintiffs could not establish standing without the document, the
Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to
determine whether FISA might preempt the state secrets
privilege.458 On remand, the district court first held that FISA
would, in fact, preempt the privilege, but a remedy would be
available only on behalf of someone who was an “aggrieved
person” under the statute.459
The plaintiffs were able to rely on public announcements by
government officials and publicly available press reports to make
a prima facie case, based on nonclassified information, that they
were aggrieved persons because of wiretaps and e-mail intercepts
454. Id. at 1224.
455. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th
Cir. 2007).
456. See id. at 1193 (noting the disclosure of the TSP and agreeing with the
district court that the lawsuit cannot therefore be barred on a state secret
basis).
457. See id. at 1204–05 (providing that each individuals’ memory of the
sealed document’s contents and speculation about the document’s contents were
“completely barred from further disclosure in this litigation”).
458. See id. at 1206 (“Rather than consider the issue for the first time on
appeal, we remand to the district court to consider whether FISA preempts the
state secrets privilege and for any proceedings collateral to that
determination.”).
459. Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush (In re NSA Telecomm. Records
Litig.), 564 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1134 (N.D. Cal. 2008). The district court held that
50 U.S.C. § 1810 contained an implicit waiver of sovereign immunity. Id. at
1125; see also 50 U.S.C. § 1810 (2012) (providing that an “aggrieved person” who
suffers from illegal electronic surveillance may recover damages, including
punitive damages and attorney’s fees).
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without a court order.460 After extended recalcitrance by the
Government, the district court ordered:
Plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case and defendants
have foregone multiple opportunities to show that a warrant
existed, including specifically rejecting the method created by
Congress for this very purpose. Defendants’ possession of the
exclusive knowledge whether or not a FISA warrant was
obtained, moreover, creates such grave equitable concerns that
defendants must be deemed estopped from arguing that a
warrant might have existed or, conversely, must be deemed to
have admitted that no warrant existed. The court now
determines [that f]or purposes of this litigation, there was no
such warrant for the electronic surveillance of any of
plaintiffs.461

With no genuine issue of material fact, the district court granted
summary judgment for the plaintiffs, and it later awarded them
about $41,000 in damages and over $2.5 million in fees and
expenses.462 The entire amount went to the attorney-plaintiffs, as
the “[d]istribution of any funds to plaintiff Al-Haramain is
impossible because Al-Haramain’s assets are blocked as a result
of its designation as a SDGT organization.”463 Indeed, the district
court acknowledged that “the government had reason to believe
that Al-Haramain supported acts of terrorism.”464 In the final
episode of this long-running litigation, the Ninth Circuit ruled
that the Government enjoyed sovereign immunity from a damage
action by the organization.465
Another large number of lawsuits alleged that
telecommunications companies violated their customers’ rights by
460. See Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush (In re NSA Telecomm.
Records Litig.), 595 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1083–86 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (describing the
precedent plaintiffs relied on in forming a prima facie case and noting that
plaintiffs met the requirements for making out a prima facie case).
461. Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Obama (In re NSA Telecomm. Records
Litig.), 700 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1197 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
462. Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Obama (In re NSA Telecomm. Records
Litig.), No. 06-1791 VRW, at *29, *46 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2010),
https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/att/alharamainorder122110.pdf.
463. Id. at *14.
464. Id. at *25.
465. See Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Obama, 690 F.3d 1089, 1099
(9th Cir. 2012) (finding that Congress did not waive sovereign immunity and
thus the Government still retained it).
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cooperating and assisting the NSA in surveillance of their
phones.466 The actions were consolidated as part of the multidistrict litigation panel in northern California.467 While these
cases were pending in district court, Congress enacted a statutory
provision rendering an electronic communications service
provider immune from suit if the Attorney General certified that
the provider helped the government in intelligence gathering,
including assistance in executing the TSP.468 Based on this
provision, the district court dismissed the pending suits against
the telecommunications companies.469 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed, rejecting a series of constitutional arguments,
including several related to the separation of powers doctrine and
due process considerations.470
But in another opinion on the same day, the Ninth Circuit
allowed a class action suit to proceed against the Government for
what the plaintiffs described as “a communications dragnet of
ordinary American citizens.”471 According to the court, the
466. Among the litigants was Pulitzer Prize-winning author Studs Terkel.
See generally Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 411 F. Supp. 2d 899 (N.D. Ill. 2006); STUDS
TERKEL, THE GOOD WAR: AN ORAL HISTORY OF WORLD WAR TWO (1984)
(containing interviews with people involved in World War Two and winning the
1985 Pulitzer Prize for General Nonfiction).
467. See NSA Multi-District Litigation, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/cases/nsa-multi-district-litigation (last visited Feb. 3, 2014)
(describing the consolidation and transfer of about forty NSA cases to the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
468. See 50 U.S.C. § 1885a–c (2012) (providing that this immunity requires
the Attorney General to certify the assistance falls into one of five categories).
469. In re NSA Telecomm. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d 949, 976 (N.D.
Cal. 2009); McMurray v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. (In re NSA Telecomm. Records
Litig.), No. 09-0131, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64621, at *12 (N.D. Cal. July 27,
2009).
470. See Hepting v. AT&T Corp. (In re NSA Telecomm. Records Litig.), 671
F.3d 881, 894–904 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing bicameralism and presentment,
the nondelegation doctrine, congressional interference with adjudication, and
notice and process on the way to rejecting the constitutional arguments); see
also McMurray v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. (In re NSA Telecomm. Records Litig.),
669 F.3d 928, 933 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction and
not reaching the merits of the Fifth Amendment takings claim).
471. Jewel v. NSA, 673 F.3d 902, 905 (9th Cir. 2011). The plaintiffs claimed
[u]sing [a] shadow network of surveillance devices, Defendants have
acquired and continue to acquire the content of a significant portion
of phone calls, emails, instant messages, text messages, web
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plaintiffs had standing by alleging a concrete and particularized
injury from the collaboration between the government and AT&T
at a specific facility in San Francisco.472 And although the claims
“strike . . . at the heart of a major public controversy involving
national security and surveillance,” the Ninth Circuit refused to
characterize the legal issues as political questions, or to impose a
heightened standing requirement for government surveillance
involving national security interests.473 Where this case will go
now after the Snowden revelations remains to be seen, but at
least the Ninth Circuit has shown itself to be the exception in
standing up against some of the government abuses.
The FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA)474 continued the
authorization of intercepts involving parties outside the United
States but stipulated that the government may not conduct
electronic surveillance or intercept wire, oral, or electronic
communications except pursuant to express statutory
authorization (for example, FISA).475 This statement of exclusive
authority should have defused the Executive argument for
unfettered discretion, but of course we now have public
admissions of massive government gathering of electronic
communications data.476
communications and other communications, both international and
domestic, of practically every American who uses the phone system or
the Internet, including Plaintiffs and class members, in an
unprecedented suspicionless general search through the nation's
communications network.
Id. at 906.
472. See id. at 908 (concluding that the injury was “concrete and
particularized” and that Jewel thus satisfied the “injury in fact” requirement
and had standing).
473. Id. at 912. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Hepting v. AT&T
Corp., No. 09-422, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 8053 (Oct. 9, 2012).
474. FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436.
475. See 50 U.S.C. § 1812 (2012) (providing that such communications may
only be conducted pursuant to the statute’s prescribed procedures or separate
statutory authorization).
476. See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima, NSA Gathered Thousands of Americans’ Emails Before Court Ordered it to Revise its Tactics, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-gatheredthousands-of-americans-e-mails-before-court-struck-downprogram/2013/08/21/146ba4b6-0a90-11e3-b87c-476db8ac34cd_story.html
(last
visited Feb. 3, 2014) (describing how the NSA collected tens of thousands of
Americans’ e-mails annually) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
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The ACLU filed suit against the FAA on behalf of a group of
attorneys, journalists, and legal, media, and human rights
organizations, arguing that the provision “allows the executive
branch sweeping and virtually unregulated authority to monitor
the international communications . . . of law-abiding U.S. citizens
and residents.”477 The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the government on the basis that the plaintiffs lacked
standing to bring the suit.478 On appeal, a panel of the Second
Circuit reversed and remanded, asserting that the plaintiffs had
standing based on a reasonable fear that their sensitive
international electronic communications were being monitored,
requiring them to engage in costly and burdensome measures to
protect the confidentiality of communications necessary for their
work.479 In September 2011, the Second Circuit denied rehearing
en banc by an equally divided vote.480
In February 2013, the Supreme Court reversed on standing
grounds, agreeing with the Government that the plaintiffs failed
to show a realistic threat of imminent injury.481 Their
speculations required assuming that the government would
target their communications, that authorization under the
statute would be judicially approved, and that government would
succeed in acquiring their communications.482 Moreover, the
plaintiffs’ choices to make expenditures to prevent interception of
confidential communications based on hypothetical future harm
Review).
477. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Amnesty Int’l
USA v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 08 CIV 6259).
478. See Amnesty Int’l USA v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633, 658
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (rejecting plaintiffs’ second standing argument and thus
denying plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment).
479. See Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2011)
(“Because standing may be based on a reasonable fear of future injury . . . and
the plaintiffs have established that they have a reasonable fear of injury . . . , we
agree that they have standing. We therefore reverse the district court’s
judgment.”)
480. See Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 667 F.3d 163, 164 (2d Cir. 2011)
(finding the Second Circuit panel did not err and thus affirming its decision).
481. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013)
(concluding the plaintiffs lacked standing because they acted pursuant to
“hypothetical future harm” and not imminent harm).
482. See id. at 1148–50 (providing that the plaintiffs’ speculation depended
on five conditions, none of which could be proven).
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was their own choice and not the direct result of identifiable
government action.483
Of course, now we know the assumptions of the Supreme
Court about judicial authorization of intercepts were unfounded
because the NSA has been monitoring anything and everything
that it chooses to monitor.484 This set of assumptions was
particularly poignant in some of the dissents from the earlier
Second Circuit denial of rehearing.485 One dissent pointed to the
FISCR’s opinion in In re Directives as offering “a glimpse into the
actual world of foreign intelligence targeting,” which “appears
quite different from the one hypothesized by plaintiffs.”486
[The FISCR] reviewed the actual procedures adopted by the
executive to satisfy PAA requirements and found that they in
fact afforded “protections above and beyond those specified” in
the statute and adequately allayed any particularity or
probable cause concerns. . . . Such scrupulous oversight rebuts
any general assumptions, unsupported by specific facts, that
the executive will instinctively abuse its targeting discretion
under the FAA. . . .487

Now that it is publicly known that the NSA has been
routinely gathering information on U.S. residents, the assertion
that the statutes “rebut . . . any general assumption, unsupported
by specific facts, that the executive will instinctively abuse its
targeting discretion” rings extremely hollow.488 This is not to say
that the judges holding that view were knowingly complicit in
government misdeeds, but they certainly chose consciously to
turn a blind eye when their colleagues were insisting on scrutiny
of actual government practices.

483. See id. at 1153 (finding that plaintiffs’ self-constructed fear was another
reason they lacked standing).
484. See supra notes 382–385, 431–433, and accompanying text (discussing
the NSA’s ability and willingness to monitor civilians and the public disclosure
of such behavior).
485. See supra note 480 and accompanying text (explaining that the Second
Circuit denied rehearing en banc in Clapper).
486. Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 667 F.3d 163, 186 (2d Cir. 2011) (Raggi,
J., dissenting).
487. Id.
488. Id.
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2. Judicial Review of Killing U.S. Citizens
The final case that I wish to highlight here is the “targeted
killing” of Anwar Al-Aulaqi, a U.S. citizen who expatriated to
Yemen and became a major jihadist figure on the Internet.489
When it was leaked in the press that Anwar al-Aulaqi had been
placed on the U.S. government’s kill lists, his father Nasser alAulaqi filed suit to assert his son’s rights to due process.490 His
lawsuit also asserted that the U.S. targeted-killing policy violated
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, as well as treaty and
customary international law.491 While asking for an injunction to
stop the government from killing his son, he sought a declaration
that the policy was illegal and disclosure of the criteria used to
determine whether to target a U.S. citizen.492
The D.C. District Court started with the observations that
this “unique and extraordinary case” presented “[s]tark, and
perplexing, questions” such as: “How is it that judicial approval is
required when the United States decides to target a U.S. citizen
overseas for electronic surveillance, but that, according to the
defendants, judicial scrutiny in prohibited when the United
States decides to target a U.S. citizen overseas for death?”493 Yet,
the court dismissed the case, holding that Nasser al-Aulaqi
lacked standing to bring the constitutional claims on behalf of his
son.494 The court also blindly asserted that there was nothing to
prevent Anwar al-Aulaqi from peacefully presenting himself at
the U.S. Embassy in Yemen and announcing his wish to vindicate
his constitutional rights in court, which, as a matter of domestic
489. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2010).
490. See id. at 20 (noting that though Al-Aulaqi’s father is the plaintiff in
the action, his hope to act for his son’s best interest is insufficient to satisfy
next-friend standing).
491. See id. at 12 (listing the plaintiff’s constitutional and statutory claims).
492. See id. (outlining plaintiff’s four requests including a “preliminary
injunction prohibiting defendants from intentionally killing Anwar Al-Aulaqi”
and “an injunction ordering defendants to disclose the criteria that the United
States uses to determine whether a U.S. citizen will be targeted for killing”
(citing Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 9–11, Al-Aulaqi v.
Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 1:10-cv-01469))).
493. Id. at 8.
494. See id. at 30 (noting that the “plaintiff lacks third party standing . . .
because his interests do not align with those of his son”).
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and international law, the U.S. government would have to respect
without resorting to violence.495 Moreover, it was not clear that
the father was serving his son’s “best interests,” understood as
acting in accordance with Anwar al-Aulaqi’s intentions or
wishes.496 There was no evidence that Nasser al-Aulaqi wanted to
vindicate his rights in a U.S. court; to the contrary, his public
statements showed disdain for the American legal system, as well
as a belief that Muslims were not bound by Western law and it
was therefore legitimate to violate U.S. law.497
Moreover, Nasser al-Aulaqi’s claims might have been barred
by sovereign immunity, because a suit against the President,
Secretary of Defense, and CIA Director was “tantamount to a suit
against the United States.”498 In the portion of its opinion most
strikingly presenting problems of judicial independence, the court
refused to decide this question by exercising its “equitable
discretion” to avoid interjecting itself into sensitive issues of
foreign affairs and activities by the military and intelligence
community.499 Serious separation-of-powers concerns would be
raised by a “judicial attempt to enjoin the President in the
performance of his official duties.”500 The same would be true of a
court order granting declaratory and injunctive relief against the
nation’s top military and intelligence advisors regarding the use
of force abroad, when such action was (purportedly) authorized by
the President himself.501

495. See id. at 17 (agreeing with defendants that the plaintiff’s son had this
alternative).
496. See id. at 20 (taking as true plaintiff’s statements that he had his son’s
best interests in mind but finding that the statements were “nonetheless
insufficient to establish that this lawsuit accords with Anwar Al-Aulaqi's best
interests”).
497. See id. at 19, 21 (concluding that Al-Aulaqui was “incommunicado” due
to his own choice and noting that Al-Aulaqui “decried the U.S. legal system and
suggested that Muslims are not bound by Western law” through his public
statements).
498. Id. at 40.
499. See id. at 42 (noting that the court did not need to decide the sovereign
immunity issue as it had “equitable discretion” not to grant plaintiff’s requested
relief because this was a “‘sensitive’ foreign affairs matter”).
500. Id. at 43 (quotations omitted).
501. See id. (explaining that a court order against the military or
intelligence would also evoke separation-of-powers concerns).
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Finally, in a similar vein, the court concluded that the case
was a nonjusticiable political question.502 This doctrine exempts
from judicial review those matters that are committed by the U.S.
Constitution to the political branches, including the precise issue
in this case—the decision to employ military force.503 According to
the court, resolution of the plaintiff’s claims would require it to
decide:
(1) [T]he precise nature and extent of Anwar Al-Aulaqi's
affiliation with AQAP;
(2) whether AQAP and al Qaeda are so closely linked
that the defendants' targeted killing of Anwar Al-Aulaqi
in Yemen would come within the United States’ current
armed conflict with al Qaeda;
(3) whether (assuming plaintiff's proffered legal standard
applies)504 Anwar Al-Aulaqi's alleged terrorist activity
renders him a “concrete, specific, and imminent threat to
life or physical safety . . . .”; and
(4) whether there are “means short of lethal force” that
the United States could “reasonably” employ to address
any threat that Anwar Al-Aulaqi poses to U.S. national
security interests. . . . Such determinations, in turn,
would require this Court . . . to understand and assess
the “capabilities of the [alleged] terrorist operative to
carry out a threatened attack, what response would be
sufficient to address that threat, possible diplomatic
considerations that may bear on such responses, the
vulnerability of potential targets that the [alleged]
terrorist[] may strike, the availability of military and
nonmilitary options, and the risks to military and

502. See id. at 46 (finding that the policy questions posed by the plaintiff’s
claims are nonjusticiable under D.C. Circuit precedent).
503. See id. at 48 (explaining that the decision to employ military force
belongs to the legislative and executive branches and review of such decisions
would thus produce major separation-of-powers concerns).
504. The standard advocated in Anwar al-Aulaqi’s complaint would preclude
targeted killing outside of armed conflict unless an individual “‘presents a
concrete, specific, and imminent threat of life or physical safety, and there are
means other than lethal force that could reasonably be employed to neutralize
the threat.’” Id. (citing Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 11,
Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 1:10-cv-01469)).
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nonmilitary personnel in attempting application of
non-lethal force.”505

It is truly a mystery why a court should have to decide any of
those questions to rule on whether a U.S. citizen abroad has due
process or other legal rights before being executed by executive
fiat. The judicial function consists of setting out the criteria for
the Executive to follow in making those decisions.506 The court
confessed its concern that “there are circumstances in which the
Executive’s unilateral decision to kill a U.S. citizen overseas is
‘constitutionally committed to the political branches’ and
judicially unreviewable” but nonetheless concluded that it was
barred from adjudicating the merits of the case.507
The United States then used aerial unmanned aircraft
(drones) to execute not just Anwar but also his son Abdulrahman
and a colleague, Samir Khan.508 In July 2012, the ACLU filed a
new suit on behalf of the families of all three, arguing that the
killings violated the Fourth Amendment’s ban on unreasonable
seizures, the Fifth Amendment’s right to due process, and the Bill
of Attainder Clause.509 In addition, the ACLU filed a FOIA
request and subsequent legal action seeking records related to
legal authority and factual basis for the targeted killing of the
three individuals.510
In a masterly display of the various doctrines considered in
this Article, on December 14, 2012, DOJ filed a motion to dismiss
the damage action on the grounds of lack of standing, political
question, qualified immunity, failure to state a claim under due

505. Id. at 46.
506. This was precisely the approach taken by the Israeli High Court in
Public Committee v. Government, HCJ 769/02 [2005] (Isr.); see also H.C. 680/88
Schnitzer v. Chief Military Censor 42(4) P.D. 617 [1989] (Isr.).
507. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 51 (D.D.C. 2010).
508. See Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta: Lawsuit Challenging Targeted Killings, supra
note 42 (explaining how the lawsuit alleges that drone attacks killed these
individuals).
509. See id. (outlining these constitutional violations and also arguing that
the attacks violated international law).
510. Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 8, ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No.
12 CIV 0794 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/tk_foia_
complaint.pdf.
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process, and Executive freedom from the Bill of Attainder
Clause.511
V. Conclusion
The “head in the sand” attitude of the U.S. Judiciary in the
past decade is a rather dismal record that does not fit the high
standard for judicial independence on which the American public
has come to rely. Many authors have discussed these cases from
the perspective of the civil rights and liberties of the individual.512
What I have attempted to do here is sketch out how the undue
deference to the Executive in “time of crisis” has undermined the
independent role of the Judiciary. Torture, executive detentions,
illegal surveillance, and now killing of U.S. citizens, have escaped
judicial review under a variety of excuses.513
To be clear, many of the people against whom these abuses
have been levied are, or were, very dangerous if not evil
individuals. Khalid Sheikh Muhamed and Anwar al-Aulaqi
should not be allowed to roam free to kill innocent civilians. But
hundreds of years of history show that there are ways of dealing
with such people within the limits of restrained government
without resort to the hubris and indignity of unreviewed
Executive discretion. The turning of blind eyes by many, albeit
not all, federal judges is a chapter of this history that will weigh
heavily against us in the future.

511. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 4, ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No.
1:12-cv-01192 (RMC) (S.D.N.Y. 2012), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/
tk_govt_motion_to_dismiss.pdf. The Bill of Attainder Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 9, cl. 3, prohibits any “‘law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts
punishment upon an identifiable individual without provision of the protections
of a judicial trial.’” Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp.,
468 U.S. 841, 846–47 (1984) (citing Nixon v. Adm’r Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,
468 (1977)).
512. See, e.g., Timothy Bazzle, Shutting the Courthouse Doors: Invoking the
State Secrets Privilege to Thwart Judicial Review in the Age of Terror, 23 GEO.
MASON U. C.R. L.J. 29, 69–70 (2012) (concluding that judicial deference to state
secrets privilege gives too much power to the Executive Branch and intrudes on
an individual’s rights to be informed of the evidence against him and not be
denied due process of law).
513. Supra Part IV.
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No judge wants to feel responsible for the deaths of
innocents. But direct responsibility for death lies with those who
contribute to the act. Meanwhile, the judge has an ethical
responsibility for abuses by government of which the Judiciary is
a part. To illustrate the threat, one federal judge resigned from
the secret FISA Court in “protest because the Bush
administration was bypassing the court on warrantless
wiretaps.”514 To be fair, his public statement before Congress
included the thought that the judges were independent but not
making fully informed decisions.515 It makes sense that this
courageous judge (who also ruled against the Government in a
major Guantanamo case516) would extol the independence of the
federal Judiciary, but perhaps those of us outside the club can be
forgiven for seriously challenging his assessment. Meanwhile,
critics are voicing the belief that recent appointments to the FISA
Court will be even more deferential to the Executive.517
To repeat, there is nothing “new” in the killing of innocents
for religious or political vengeance.518 This violence has always
been with us and unfortunately will continue despite our best
efforts to curb it. Pleas for Executive carte blanche power are
exactly what judicial independence was developed to avoid, and
what many statements in various declarations of human rights
are all about. The way of unreviewed Executive discretion is the
way of tyranny.

514. Pema Levy, Former Judge: Secret Court Needs Reform, INT’L BUS.
TIMES (July 9, 2013), http://www.ibtimes.com/former-fisa-court-judge-secretcourt-needs-reform-1338671a (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
515. Id.
516. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 173 (D.D.C. 2004), rev’d,
415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2004), aff’d, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
517. See Charlie Savage, Roberts’s Picks Reshaping Secret Surveillance
Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2013, at A1 (arguing that Chief Justice Roberts’
appointments to the FISA Court have given it a very Republican makeup and
noting that one scholar has proposed the President nominate judges for the
Court).
518. Supra note 302 and accompanying text.

